The court denies defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his plea for IAC because defense counsel allegedly overlooked a valid motion to suppress, seriously complicated now by the fact it was third party consent of the codefendant. \u201cIt is most apparent to the court that Bradford’s challenge to his attorney’s representation is nothing more than a mere after-the-fact change of heart about his guilty plea. He has not come forward with anything (factually or legally) that he did not know before he entered his plea. Based on the government’s representations and Bradford’s responses and actions throughout this litigation, the court concludes that his attorney’s decision not to file motions to suppress was not unreasonable.\u201d United States v. Bradford, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18092 (M.D.Ala. Feb. 16, 2016).<\/p>\n
Defendant\u2019s general denial of consent was not credited when compared to the officers\u2019 specific testimony about consent. United States v. Hodge, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18020 (S.D.Ga. Jan. 19, 2016),* adopted 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17661 (S.D. Ga., Feb. 12, 2016).*<\/p>\n
Plaintiff\u2019s pro se \u00a7 1983 complaint that police came to his door to talk to him about a murder investigation doesn\u2019t state a Fourth or Fifth Amendment claim. As to the claim his VA records were viewed, that fails to state a constitutional claim. Olson v. Carmack<\/a>, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 2962 (10th Cir. Feb. 19, 2016).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The court denies defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his plea for IAC because defense counsel allegedly overlooked a valid motion to suppress, seriously complicated now by the fact it was third party consent of the codefendant. \u201cIt is most apparent to … Continue reading