Civil commitment order justified officers’ entry to take custody of plaintiff under the Fourth Amendment. Montgomery v. Morgan County, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15846 (S.D. Ind. February 29, 2008):<\/p>\n
Other federal courts have found no Fourth Amendment violation in connection with forced entries carried out in order to enforce civil orders related to the commitment of the mentally infirm. In McCabe v. Life-Line Ambulance Service, Inc., <\/em>77 F.3d 540 (1st Cir. 1996), an elderly woman died as she was being removed from her home after a forced entry by city police officers and an ambulance crew. The forced entry was made to execute a ten-day involuntary commitment order or “pink paper,” which is issued in Massachusetts after an expert medical finding that the person poses a likelihood of potential serious harm. Id<\/em>. at 547-48. They were acting under an established City policy, permitting forcible, warrantless entries to enforce involuntary civil commitment orders. Id. At 542. The district court granted summary judgment for the woman’s estate on its \u00a7 1983 claim that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment. Id<\/em>. at 543. On appeal, the First Circuit reversed, finding that the policy fell under the “special needs” exception to the presumption against warrantless entry. Id. at 550-54; see also Doby v. DeCrescenzo<\/em>, 171 F.3d 858, 871 (3rd Cir. 1999) (found that involuntary commitment of those deemed dangerous to themselves or others qualifies as a “special need” permitting county to act, in compliance with the Fourth Amendment, without a warrant).<\/p>\n
Even if this court were not to give the order of apprehension in this case the same authority and effect as it would an arrest warrant, the circumstances that existed, with an escaped or recalcitrant, court ordered, mental health patient refusing to cooperate with law enforcement, were such that an exception existed to the presumption of a need for a warrant before entering the residence at 8389 N. Briarhopper Road. Probable cause to find Montgomery a danger existed at the time his involuntary commitment was ordered by the same court that issued the order of apprehension. Certainly neither the deputies or the Sheriff’s department had reason to expect that the court would have issued an apprehension order without assessing whether Montgomery continued to pose that danger to others or himself. Accordingly, the entry into the residence did not violate Montgomery’s Fourth Amendment rights.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
In another case, however, the Fourth Cirucit held that the officer violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights in executing a civil commitment order against her, but he was entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clear at the time. Bates v. Harvey<\/a>, 518 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2008).*<\/p>\n
Officers lawfully and inevitably looked in defendant’s backpack that was thrown clear after an accident during a highspeed chase where he wrecked his car. Inevitable discovery was not raised in the district court until a prior remand from the Third Circuit, and defendant had the opportunity to litigate it. United States v. Sinkler<\/a>, 267 Fed. Appx. 171 (3d Cir. 2008) (unpublished).*<\/p>\n
“[A] trooper who effected a traffic stop because an out-of-state temporary registration permit was not displayed on the rear of the car, as required by Kansas law, did not act unreasonably for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Martinez, 518 F.3d 763 (10th Cir. 2008).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading