The woman driving defendant\u2019s car with the keys in hand had apparent authority to consent to its search. That consent, however, did not extend to a digital camera in the car. \u201cThe consent the officers received to search the car did not extend to the camera’s contents. \u2018Consent to search an area is distinguishable from consent to search an object or closed container located within that area.\u2019 Turner, 23 F. Supp. 3d at 310. The Court must consider \u2018the defendant’s expectation of privacy in the object apart from his expectation of privacy in the [area being searched].\u2019 U.S. v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 2002).\u201d Riley essentially applies to searches of all digital media. United States v. Whiteside, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84369 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2015).<\/p>\n
A pre-enforcement challenge to whether parole conditions violate the state constitution\u2019s privacy provision isn\u2019t ripe. \u201cFurther factual development is needed, and Cates does not face a significant risk of hardship by our declining to review the merits in the absence of developed facts.\u201d State v. Cates<\/a>, 2015 Wash. LEXIS 697 (July 2, 2015).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The woman driving defendant\u2019s car with the keys in hand had apparent authority to consent to its search. That consent, however, did not extend to a digital camera in the car. \u201cThe consent the officers received to search the car … Continue reading