2255 petitioner had no standing, even on his own allegations, so whether defense counsel was ineffective for not calling him to testify to standing was moot. \u201cBecause the Court finds that Campbell’s underlying claim to have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Praver house lacks merit, it is unnecessary to address whether Haine performed deficiently by not calling Campbell or certain others to testify at the suppression hearing. See Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 375. As discussed above, even if the information about Campbell’s connection to the Praver house was true, it still would not establish a legitimate expectation of privacy. Moreover, Campbell has not overcome the strong presumption that Haine’s decision was strategic. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ….\u201d In addition, defense counsel had a strategic reason for not calling petitioner at the suppression hearing for fear he would be easily \u201ctripped up\u201d by the government. Campbell v. United States, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78557 (M.D.Fla. June 17, 2015),* R&R 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77841 (M.D.Fla. April 24, 2015).*<\/p>\n
The Herring exclusionary rule is not analogous to exclusion of evidence for a discovery violation. Here, it was a 911 call made during a brutal sex assault and murder on tribal lands. Exclusion here was an appropriate sanction, determined after a remand (United States v. Yepa, 572 Fed. Appx. 577 (10th Cir. 2014)). United States v. Yepa<\/a>, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 10167 (10th Cir. June 17, 2015).* <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" 2255 petitioner had no standing, even on his own allegations, so whether defense counsel was ineffective for not calling him to testify to standing was moot. \u201cBecause the Court finds that Campbell’s underlying claim to have had a reasonable expectation … Continue reading