Resisting arrest conviction does not collaterally estop an excessive force claim. Lamond v. Maher, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9078 n. 1 (S.D. Ind. February 5, 2008):<\/p>\n
The defendants also argue that Lamond is collaterally estopped by the outcome of the criminal prosecution–the outcome being that Lamond was convicted based on his plea of guilty–from pressing his civil rights claims here. There is a body of law that addresses how a court in a civil suit is to treat a criminal conviction where the use of excessive force by police officers could have been a defense to a charge of resisting law enforcement. This principle cannot be applied conclusively here, however, for even if a jury had convicted Lamond this would not automatically bar a claim of excessive force in a subsequent civil action. See Hernandez v. City of Los Angeles<\/em>, 624 F.2d 935, 937-38 (9th Cir. 1980); DuFour-Dowell v. Cogger<\/em>, 969 F.Supp. 1107, 1117-18 (N.D.Ill. 1997). “Even while resisting an arrest, an arrestee can be subjected to force excessive for the situation.” Id.<\/em> at 1118. The State’s offer of proof in Lamond’s cases recited Lamond’s actions, not those of any of the police officers. That offer of proof at least does not entirely negate the viability of Lamond’s claims in the present case, and thus the court will not rely on Lamond’s conviction to resolve his claims.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Summary judgment for officer rejected for allegation he entered the wrong residence on a search warrant; the one next door. A reasonable officer would have known. Mendoza v. Whitehouse, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8904 (N.D. Cal. January 25, 2008).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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