There was sufficient indicia of proper issuance of an unsigned search warrant to make the search warrant valid. The Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant be signed if it was reviewed and otherwise properly issued by the issuing magistrate. This is an issue of first impression in the Third Circuit. United States v. Jackson, 617 F. Supp. 2d 316 (M.D. Pa. 2008):<\/p>\n
Provided that a search warrant is applied for in person, the text of neither the Fourth Amendment nor Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 requires the issuing authority to sign the warrant. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(3)(D) (limiting the requirement that an issuing authority must “immediately sign the original warrant” to telephonic warrants); see also United States v. K. Pierce<\/em>, 493 F. Supp. 2d 611, 640 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). Instead, the Fourth Amendment dictates that a warrant shall not “issue” unless it is supported by probable cause. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Generally, an issuing authority’s finding of probable cause is conveyed via his or her signature on a warrant. However, signing a search warrant is just one of a number of methods that an issuing authority may use to signal that the warrant complies with the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement. Accord Perrin v. City of Elberton<\/em>, No. 03-106, 2005 WL 1563530, at *8 (M.D. Ga. July 1, 2005) (“[W]hile an unsigned warrant may not be per se insufficient under the Fourth Amendment, it must be clear to the arresting officers that the substantive requirements of the Fourth Amendment were met — that a neutral and detached magistrate made a finding of probable cause.”); United States v. Evans<\/em>, 469 F. Supp. 2d 893, 897 (D. Mont. 2007) (“Issuance serves to demonstrate that a neutral and detached magistrate has reviewed the warrant application and affidavit and made an independent and objective determination that probable cause exists to justify the search.”). In the absence of a signature, “a court may consider other evidence that the judge found probable cause and approved the warrant.” Perrin, 2005 WL 1563530, at *8; see also United States v. Hondras<\/em>, 296 F.3d 601, 602 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that issuance is “not synonymous with signing”); Evans<\/em>, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 897 (stating that issuance requires that a warrant “contain some indication that the search is officially authorized”). To hold otherwise would elevate form over substance and allow inadvertent, procedural errors to vitiate substantively valid warrants. Accord United States v. Turner<\/em>, 558 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1977) (referring to the issuing authority’s responsibility to sign a search warrant as a “purely ministerial task” and holding that the Fourth Amendment is satisfied provided that he or she “performs the substantive tasks of determining probable cause and authorizing the issuance of the warrant”).<\/p>\n
Accordingly, the question becomes what “other evidence” is sufficient to indicate that the issuing authority made a finding of probable cause. Other United States District Courts have suggested that the following can constitute indicia of issuance: (1) an indication on the warrant of the date before which the search must be conducted, (2) the presence of a case number indicating that the warrant has been filed, (3) the presence of the issuing authority’s initials or other imprimaturs of judicial authority on the warrant, and (4) an in-person acknowledgment by the issuing authority to the affiant that probable cause has been found. See, e.g., Evans<\/em>, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 897 (holding that an unsigned warrant had not been validly issued where the first two indicia were absent); K. Pierce<\/em>, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 640 (holding that an unsigned warrant had been validly issued where the affiant personally appeared before the magistrate judge who had placed his initials and the abbreviation “USMJ” for United States Magistrate Judge in three separate places on the face of the warrant); Perrin<\/em>, 2005 WL 1563530, at *8 (holding that an unsigned warrant had not been validly issued where the warrant was applied for remotely and no other indicia of a probable cause finding were present).<\/p>\n
The court finds that the warrant in the instant case contains sufficient indicia of issuance to satisfy Fourth Amendment requirements. First, the warrant, which is located in the lower third of a document entitled “Application for Search Warrant and Authorization,” contains a handwritten date and time before which the search must be conducted — specifically, before “2:00 P.M. March 7, 2007.” The issuing authority also placed a checkmark in a box signifying that the warrant “shall be served as soon as practicable and shall be served only between the hours of 6AM to 10PM.” Second, the upper right-hand corner of the application contains the handwritten warrant control number 00025-07-02, which indicates that the warrant had been filed. Third, the warrant contains various imprimaturs of judicial authority. Specifically, the application contains two seals that were affixed by the issuing authority and are labeled “Magisterial District Judge, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, York County District 19-2-01.” One of these seals is specifically located in the warrant portion of the application. The issuing authority also placed a checkmark in the box indicating his title as “Magisterial District Judge” and inserted the handwritten date and time March 5, 2007 at 2:00 P.M. in a section labeled: “Issued under my hand this ___ day of _____, ___ at __.M.” Finally, Detective Craul applied for the search warrant in person and observed the issuing authority prepare and seal the warrant. Because the instant warrant contains each and every indicia of issuance that has been recognized by other district courts, the court finds that the warrant complies with the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. Defendants’ motion to suppress on this ground will be denied.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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