Upon seeing the police, defendant shook hands with the people in the group he was talking to and walked away. This is hardly suspicious behavior and does not amount to flight. This conduct, as testified to by the police, is not objectively reasonable suspicion. United States v. McCrae, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2314 (E.D. N.Y. January 11, 2008)*:<\/p>\n
While flight upon seeing police officers can give rise to reasonable suspicion if it occurs in a high-crime area, see Illinois v. Wardlow<\/em><\/a>, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“Headlong flight … is the consummate act of evasion”), it is clear, and I find, that McCrae’s behavior fell well short of this threshold, cf. id.<\/em> at 125 (“‘[R]efusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.'” (quoting Bostick<\/em><\/a>, 501 U.S. at 437)). Far from running headlong, McCrae calmly walked away from Daughtry, shaking hands with the people he was standing with before leaving and at no time quickening his pace.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Mental health seizure is based on probable cause to believe the person is a danger to self or others, and “[j]ust as actual innocence will not render invalid an arrest that is properly based upon probable cause that criminal activity was occurring, a mental health seizure can rest upon probable cause even when the person seized does not actually suffer from a dangerous mental condition. … Courts evaluate the existence of probable cause from the perspective of a reasonable and objective person in the position of the seizing official. … ‘If the circumstances, viewed objectively, support a finding of probable cause [then] the arresting officer’s actual motives are irrelevant.'” (citations omitted) Ziegler v. Aukerman<\/a>, 512 F.3d 777, 2008 FED App. 0021P (6th Cir. 2008).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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