Forfeiture claimant’s complaint about retention of the property being too long as a Fourth Amendment violation stated no claim. It was not disputed that the initial seizure was reasonable, and a reasonable retention of the property pending forfeiture does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Cook v. United States DEA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 761 (W.D. Pa. January 4, 2008):<\/p>\n
To the extent that he can meet that requirement, however, the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is whether the “seizure”–here, Brautigam’s treatment of the property between November 22 and December 9–was reasonable. E.g., Bruton v. Paesani<\/em>, 162 Fed. Appx. 151, 153 (3d Cir. 2006). This inquiry entails “an objective assessment of an officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him.” Scott v. United States<\/em><\/a>, 436 U.S. 128, 137, 98 S. Ct. 1717, 56 L. Ed. 2d 168 (1978). “[T]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.” Bell v. Wolfish<\/em>, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979). For the reasons discussed above, under the undisputed facts, no reasonable jury could find unreasonable the time period or circumstances of retention for which Brautigam is responsible. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that a constitutional violation occurred. This is decisive, as fatal to either his prima facie case or his anti-immunity analysis.<\/p>\n
Moreover, I would find Defendant entitled to immunity even if I were to proceed with the remainder of the inquiry. As noted above, authority is scarce regarding the Fourth Amendment parameters for retaining legally seized property. Plaintiff points to case law suggesting that at some indefinite point in time, continued retention converts a legal seizure into an illegal one. He points to no authority, however, that would clearly or reasonably permit one to pinpoint illegality in this case.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Officer had reasonable suspicion for stop and detention. Defendant’s version is rejected because it was contrary to ordinary police practice which the court has heard so many times before. United States v. Sweeney, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95363 (N.D. Ohio December 18, 2007).*<\/p>\n
Officer’s belief in woman’s apparent authority to consent was obviously reasonable where she had lived there for months, the phone was in her name, and her stuff was inside. United States v. Short, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1028 (N.D. W.Va. January 7, 2008).*<\/p>\n
Listening to a CI’s transaction with the defendant coupled with a plain view through defendant’s vehicle’s window gave probable cause for defendant’s arrest and vehicle search. United States v. Alarcon-Carballar, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 804 (S.D. W. Va. January 4, 2008).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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