“Standing” stopped being a valid term, but the court uses it anyway for convenience sake, and the defendant had “standing.” United States v. Killeaney, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95255, n.1 (D. S.D. October 31, 2007):<\/p>\n
1. Almost a decade ago, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier rejection of “standing” nomenclature. Minnesota v. Carter<\/em><\/a>, 525 U.S. 83, 87-88, 119 S. Ct. 469, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1998). Beginning in Rakas v. Illinois<\/em><\/a>, 439 U.S. 128, 139-40, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978), the Supreme Court replaced the standing inquiry with new vocabulary tailored to the principles that undergird the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Sturgis<\/em>, 238 F.3d 956, 958 (8th Cir.) (citing Carter<\/em>, 525 U.S. at 88), cert denied<\/em>, 534 U.S. 880, 122 S. Ct. 182, 151 L. Ed. 2d 127 (2002). In Carter, the Court stated that “a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable …. ”<\/p>\n
For convenience, and to track the verbiage found in Defendant’s Motion, the Court will use the “standing” term for purposes of describing Defendant’s right to assert the Exclusionary Rule as a bar to evidence obtained through an alleged violation of his own Fourth Amendment rights.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Comment:<\/em> Get over it, Judge. “Standing” is how we were taught, and it is shorthand for “does the defendant have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place or thing searched or seized?” Everybody knows what “standing” means. It is not unlike “good faith exception” means that the defendant loses. We know the language, so don’t waste our time.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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