{"id":1655,"date":"2008-05-28T08:25:21","date_gmt":"2008-01-04T08:32:32","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2008-01-04T08:32:32","slug":"en-US","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=1655","title":{"rendered":"Unsworn knowledge of officer can be used to establish good faith exception"},"content":{"rendered":"

W.D. Va. discusses the good faith exception at length [ad nauseum<\/em>] to determine whether there was probable cause, or at least an objective basis for the officer relying on it. More significantly, the court found that unsworn information outside the affidavit may be considered in determining whether the good faith exception applies. United States v. Doyle, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81 (W.D. Va. January 2, 2008):<\/p>\n

The court is of the opinion that unsworn testimony may be considered in the context of a Leon good-faith analysis as part of the totality of the circumstances and especially in a case where there is no showing of bad faith on the part of the police officers obtaining or executing the warrant. While the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, the judicially created exclusionary rule steps outside the bounds of the Fourth Amendment requirements and only seeks to deter illegal searches and seizures by deterring police misconduct. In a situation where police misconduct exists, the exclusionary rule applies. However, if the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use is unwarranted. See United States v. Janis<\/em><\/a>, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976). Because the rule is prudential rather than constitutionally mandated, it is only applicable, therefore, where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott<\/em><\/a>, 524 U.S. 357, 362-63 (1998) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 907) (internal citations omitted).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

A controlled buy with defendant gave probable cause for his arrest in a car when, shortly thereafter, he left the premises and got in a car. Uniform officers made the stop at the narc’s request. United States v. Cardenas-Celestino<\/a>, 510 F.3d 830 (8th Cir. 2008).*<\/p>\n

Reasonable suspicion quickly developed during defendant’s stop when he didn’t know the name of his passengers and his story about where he was going changed. His consent thereafter was valid. United States v. Rojas-Silos<\/a>, 260 Fed. Appx. 49 (10th Cir. 2008)* (unpublished).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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