An anonymous 911 call of a domestic disturbance does not per se permit an entry, but here it did. It depends on the content of the call. United States v. Wadley, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94999 (W.D. Pa. December 28, 2007):<\/p>\n
While this Court declines to hold that a 911 emergency call reporting domestic violence per se provides for a finding of exigent circumstances, the Court finds that the police officers’ entry into the home was plainly reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances presented here. In addition to the 911 emergency telephone call relaying a domestic violence incident, the Court finds significant that the police officers also received a 911 emergency telephone call via the dispatch officer reporting a possible hostage situation at the same address. Therefore, assuming arguendo that Ms. Blue’s answering the door alleviated any exigency related to the domestic violence call, see Black<\/em>, 482 F.3d at 1039-41 (finding exigency where police officers could not find the 911 caller and purported victim of domestic violence dispute), a point the Court does not concede, based on the knowledge of the police officers at the time and transmitted to them through the 911 dispatch officer, the police officers were still responding to a possible hostage situation or the possibility of other victims of domestic violence in the residence. See U.S. v. Holloway<\/em>, 290 F.3d 1331, 1339 (11th Cir. 2002) (providing that “the fact that a 911 caller chooses-or is forced-to remain anonymous may very well have little bearing on the veracity of the caller. If law enforcement could not rely on information conveyed by anonymous 911 callers, their ability to respond effectively to emergency situations would be significantly curtailed”). Furthermore, the Court highlights Officer Jenkins’ credible testimony regarding the inherent danger and unpredictability of domestic violence disputes. See Tr. at 7:9-16 (“Q[uestion]: Can you describe the situation as an officer in response to a domestic situation? A[nswer]: It’s tense. You don’t know what you are dealing with when you get there. When you get there, sometimes the people that called you can turn on you if you are going to arrest someone they don’t want you to arrest. You don’t know what’s going to happen, and you don’t know who is at fault and who is armed, if anyone is high on drugs. Yon don’t know any of those things. They just dispatch you and say help, they are fighting”). In the case at bar, in which citizens call upon police officers to enter a possibly volatile situation, the Court finds that the same police officers’ on-the-spot decision to enter the home without a warrant, a decision which transpired over the matter of approximately one minute, was reasonable.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Officer was permitted entry by consent by defendant’s sister to look for him for a warrantless arrest for domestic battery on his girlfriend. They found him in a bedroom, and there was a scuffle for a gun. The entry was valid under Randolph<\/em><\/a> because defendant did not object when he could have to the threshold entry because he was feigning being asleep. The trial court erred in suppressing. State v. Clavette<\/a>, 969 So. 2d 463 (Fla. App. 5DCA 2007):<\/p>\n
In Randolph<\/em>, the Supreme Court held that HN3″a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident.” 547 U.S. at 120 (emphasis added). By holding that only the express refusal of consent is sufficient to overcome the consent given to the police by another resident, we conclude that the Supreme Court intended that such refusal be direct, firm and explicit, and not one gleaned by implication or inference. Indeed, the Randolph opinion went on to posit an example that has significant implications here. The Court said that “if a potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the door and objects, the co-tenant’s permission does not suffice for a reasonable search, whereas the potential objector, nearby but not invited to take part in the threshold colloquy, loses out.” Id.<\/em> at 105. The latter is precisely what occurred here. <\/p>\n
. . .<\/p>\n
In the case before us, Mr. Clavette never expressly refused consent. To the contrary, just as Randolph<\/em> suggested, he was either hiding, resting or sleeping in his bedroom and did not hear or chose not to respond to the police prior to their entry into his home. In any event, under the rule adopted in Randolph<\/em>, Mr. Clavette’s lack of express refusal to the police entry was insufficient to overcome the consent given by Ms. Greene.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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