{"id":16512,"date":"2015-03-27T14:29:13","date_gmt":"2015-03-27T19:29:13","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=16512"},"modified":"2015-03-27T14:29:13","modified_gmt":"2015-03-27T19:29:13","slug":"ca4-without-emotional-distress-claim-knock-and-announce-violation-worth-only-nominal-damages","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=16512","title":{"rendered":"CA4: Without emotional distress claim, knock-and-announce violation worth only nominal damages"},"content":{"rendered":"

A knock-and-announce violation is clearly established law, so no qualified immunity. But here, without an emotional distress claim, it’s only worth nominal damages, so the damages should be remitted. Here, there was a death of another, but plaintiff waived any damages related to that. Kane v. Lewis<\/a>, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3990 (4th Cir. March 13, 2015):
\n<\/p>\n

We turn now to the Officers\u2019 primary argument on appeal \u2014 that the district court erred by failing to remit the jury\u2019s damages award in favor of Kane on the knock-and-announce claim to nominal damages. For the reasons that follow, we agree.<\/p>\n

The Officers argue that, in finding in the Officers\u2019 favor on the excessive force claim, the jury determined that Detective Lewis shot Cornish in self-defense, and therefore \u201cnecessarily concluded that Cornish realized and appreciated that the Officers were police officers prior to advancing upon [Detective] Lewis with a knife.\u201d Appellants\u2019 Br. at 33-34. They therefore contend that \u201cCornish\u2019s undisputed [conduct] in attacking [Detective] Lewis\u201d was the \u201csuperseding cause of his death,\u201d id. at 39 \u2014 and that there was no evidence that would have allowed the jury reasonably to conclude otherwise.<\/p>\n

Kane responds, and the second district court agreed, that \u201c[t]he jury had sufficient evidence to conclude that in the absence of a knock and announcement … it was reasonably foreseeable that a surprised Cornish may rush to the front door and take action in supposed self-defense and that a police officer may view that action as threatening and shoot and kill him.\u201d Appellee\u2019s Br. at 33. This view, however, does not accurately reflect either the applicable law or the facts of record.<\/p>\n

Damages awarded under \u00a7 1983 for violations of constitutional rights are ordinarily governed by common law tort principles. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1986). \u201c[T]he basic purpose of a \u00a7 1983 damages award should be to compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights ….\u201d Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978) (emphasis added). A plaintiff asserting a constitutional tort under \u00a7 1983 must therefore satisfy the familiar element of proximate causation. See Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 290 (5th Cir. 2005) (\u201cSection 1983 … require[s] a showing of proximate causation, which is evaluated under the common law standard.\u201d); see also Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 800 (4th Cir. 1994) (\u201c[T]he causal link in \u00a7 1983 cases is analogous to proximate cause.\u201d). Section 1983 tort defendants are certainly \u201cresponsible for the natural consequences of [their] actions.\u201d Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 n.7 (1986) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961)) (internal quotation mark omitted). However, \u201c[a] superseding cause [will] break[] the chain of proximate causation.\u201d Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 185 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Warner v. Orange Cnty. Dep\u2019t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1071 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that \u201cin cases brought under \u00a7 1983 a superseding cause, as traditionally understood in common law tort doctrine, will relieve a defendant of liability\u201d). Specifically, the \u201csubsequent acts of independent decision-makers … may constitute intervening superseding causes that break the causal chain\u201d and insulate police officers from \u00a7 1983 liability. Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012).<\/p>\n

In similar circumstances, the Third Circuit has held that officers are liable only for \u201cthe harm \u2018proximately\u2019 or \u2018legally\u2019 caused by [their illegal entry]\u201d and not \u201cfor all of the harm caused in the \u2018philosophic\u2019 or but-for sense by the illegal entry.\u201d Bodine v. Warwick, 72 F.3d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 1995) (Alito, J.). As such, officers who have unlawfully entered a home are not liable for \u201charm produced by a \u2018superseding cause\u2019\u201d or the harm caused by the officers\u2019 \u201cnon-tortious, as opposed to … tortious, \u2018conduct,\u2019 such as the use of reasonable force.\u201d Id. The Bodine court illustrated its view with a hypothetical similar to the facts before us: if officers improperly entered a suspect\u2019s house without knocking and announcing their presence but \u2014 once the officers were inside and had identified themselves \u2014 the suspect broke away and killed two of the officers, a third officer would not \u201cnecessarily [be] liable for the harm caused to the suspect [in attempting to disarm him] on the theory that the illegal entry without knocking and announcing rendered any subsequent use of force unlawful.\u201d Id.<\/p>\n

Other courts have also addressed \u00a7 1983 causation in similar circumstances and determined that a plaintiff\u2019s conduct was the superseding cause of harm when it precipitated subsequent harm caused by an officer\u2019s use of force. See James v. Chavez, 511 F. App\u2019x 742, 750 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (concluding that, when a suspect was killed while attempting to stab a police officer, it was the suspect\u2019s \u201cunlawful and deliberate attack on the SWAT team [that] constitute[d] a superseding cause of his death\u201d); Estate of Sowards v. City of Trenton, 125 F. App\u2019x 31, 41 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (holding that the suspect\u2019s \u201cactions in threatening … officers with [a] handgun are what led to his injuries and death\u201d).<\/p>\n

Turning to the record, we conclude that no reasonable jury could have found that the Officers\u2019 knock-and-announce violation proximately caused Cornish\u2019s death. See Bodine, 72 F.3d at 400. The evidence Kane presented at trial was insufficient to establish that Cornish did not recognize that the men in his apartment were police officers, and therefore that the Officers\u2019 illegal entry was the legal cause of Cornish\u2019s death. Kane presented the testimony of Cornish\u2019s roommate, Brad, who was not at home at the time of the search, and the expert testimony of Dr. John Adams, a physician and board certified pathologist. Brad testified that the door to the master bedroom, which was old and had to be lifted before it could be opened, was open when he left the apartment approximately two hours before the search. See J.A. 481-83. He also testified that a bicycle and a stereo were located in the area where Officer Shorter stumbled to the right of Cornish\u2019s master bedroom door, J.A. 483; a crime scene photo indicated that neither item toppled during the confrontation. J.A. 205-06. Dr. Adams testified that he believed that Cornish moved \u201ca foot or two … forward\u201d in between the first and second shots before landing in the doorway between the living room and kitchen, and that he was unable to determine how fast Cornish was moving when he was shot. J.A. 688. Dr. Adams also testified that he could form only a \u201cvery incomplete\u201d opinion as to Cornish\u2019s position at the time of each shot, J.A. 684, and that he could not definitely conclude whether Cornish was holding a sheathed knife in his hand at the time of the first shot, although the knife was found under his body. J.A. 697. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Kane\u2019s favor, this evidence reveals nothing about Cornish\u2019s state of mind as he advanced on the Officers or his opportunity to recognize them as police. Accordingly, Kane\u2019s evidence is insufficient to establish that Cornish\u2019s death was \u201cthe natural consequence[] of [the Officers\u2019] actions.\u201d Malley, 475 U.S. at 344 n.7.<\/p>\n

Moreover, the undisputed evidence establishes that Cornish must have recognized that the men in his apartment were police officers. It is undisputed that Cornish was found in the doorway between the living room and the kitchen. To reach that point, he had to travel more than 16 feet across an illuminated living room toward an illuminated kitchen in the direction of two police officers in SWAT gear who were shouting their identity. On these facts, as the first district court aptly recognized, Cornish \u201cmust have known that the men in his apartment were police officers but advanced on them nonetheless, and … no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise.\u201d J.A. 79.<\/p>\n

Unfortunately for Kane, the strategic decision to abandon his claim for damages for emotional distress Cornish suffered during the period of time between the Officers\u2019 entry and Cornish\u2019s death constrains him here. Kane is no longer able to pursue recovery for that critical interval, which the claim itself recognizes existed. Had those claims been presented to the jury, it would have been easier for us to find an evidentiary basis for a monetary award other than nominal damages.<\/p>\n

Because Cornish must have known that the men were police officers, yet advanced toward them with a knife, his \u201cunlawful and deliberate attack on the [police] constitute[d] a superseding cause of his death.\u201d James, 511 F. App\u2019x at 750. In other words, the Officers\u2019 illegal entry was not the legal cause of Cornish\u2019s death; rather, he was \u201ckilled as a direct result of trying to stab a police officer.\u201d Id. Accordingly, Kane is entitled only to nominal damages to vindicate the deprivation of Cornish\u2019s constitutional rights on the knock-and-announce claim.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

A knock-and-announce violation is clearly established law, so no qualified immunity. But here, without an emotional distress claim, it’s only worth nominal damages, so the damages should be remitted. Here, there was a death of another, but plaintiff waived any … Continue reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[45,40],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-16512","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-45","category-qualified-immunity"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16512","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=16512"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16512\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":16513,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16512\/revisions\/16513"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=16512"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=16512"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=16512"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}