{"id":1641,"date":"2008-03-07T12:56:54","date_gmt":"2007-12-29T11:16:16","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-12-29T11:16:16","slug":"en-US","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=1641","title":{"rendered":"General reasonable suspicion of driving without a license just because of knowledge of the defendant"},"content":{"rendered":"

Hawai’i decides a case on reasonable suspicion from where the officer had reason based on the timing of defendant’s reappearence on the streets after a prior arrest for driving without a license. The court provides an insightful look into how the timing of the second sighting can provide reasonable suspicion. There was a dissenting opinion, too. State v. Spillner<\/a>, 116 Haw. 351, 173 P.3d 498 (2007):<\/p>\n

Spillner challenges this conclusion as applied to the instant matter. He contends that, regardless of how close in time prior criminal activity is with current activity of a similar nature, the prior activity cannot be a factor in the analysis of reasonable suspicion and that an officer’s prior knowledge of past violations, standing alone, can never, as a matter of law, authorize a traffic stop predicated solely upon the officer’s suspicion that a driver is committing the offenses of driving without a license or driving without adequate insurance.<\/p>\n

This absolutist proposition is demonstrably flawed. Let us posit that, late one evening, an officer effects a valid traffic stop of a vehicle after witnessing an uncontested violation of the traffic or vehicle safety codes and, incidental to that valid stop, the officer discovers that the driver is not merely without his or her license but is, in fact, unlicensed to drive in the jurisdiction. Upon encountering the same individual later the same evening, once again driving — at a time during which the license-issuing authority has not yet reopened — the officer would have more than reasonable suspicion to effect a second brief traffic stop of the driver to investigate whether he or she is driving without a license. Reasonable suspicion can, therefore, be established that the defendant has fixedly refused to cease prior criminal behavior, personally observed by the officer, absent other observed violations of the traffic or safety codes.<\/p>\n

Even in light of a more protracted interval, however, during which the individual could have corrected the former criminal behavior, a police officer may nevertheless have reasonable suspicion that the person has, in fact, failed to amend his or her behavior. To extend the hypothetical, if the second encounter occurs after the licensing authority has reopened, it would then be conceivable for the defendant to have renewed his or her license in the interim — the realistic likelihood of the defendant doing so increasing with the passage of time — but, depending on the particular facts informing the officer’s decision, reasonable suspicion could still warrant effecting a traffic stop of the driver, despite the possibility of innocence, because “[a] determination that reasonable suspicion exists … need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct,” Arvizu<\/em>, 534 U.S. at 277; see also United States v. Cortez-Galaviz<\/em>, 495 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Reasonable suspicion requires a dose of reasonableness and simply does not require an officer to rule out every possible lawful explanation for suspicious circumstances before effecting a brief stop to investigate further.”) (concluding that reliance on twenty-day old information that the driver did not have insurance did not render the investigatory stop unreasonable); Decoteau<\/em>, 681 N.W.2d at 806 (explaining that “[t]he reasonable suspicion standard does not require an officer to rule out every possible innocent excuse … before stopping a vehicle for investigation,” and, insofar as “[p]robabilities, not hard certainties, are used in determining reasonable suspicion,” concluding that “[t]he officer’s suspicion is not rendered unreasonable merely because the driver’s license may have been reinstated in the intervening week”).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Owner of rental units’ nephew had apparent authority to consent to entry of his uncle’s cabin he was caring for that he thought had intruders in it. This right was superior to the person inside who had an oral sublease never conveyed to the landlord. People v. Dean<\/a>, 2007 NY Slip Op 10417, 46 A.D.3d 1229, 848 N.Y.S.2d 736 (3d Dist. 2007):<\/p>\n

Here, “based upon an objective view of the circumstances present” (People v Adams<\/em>, supra), the trooper’s belief that the nephew, as the caretaker of the property, had authority to consent to the search of a rental unit that was supposed to be vacant was reasonable (see id.<\/em>; …). Stated otherwise, it was reasonable to conclude that the nephew had authority to permit the trooper to enter a rental unit that he, as well as Rolleri, believed to be empty to investigate the complaint of intruders inside (see People v McMahon<\/em>, supra). While defendant apparently believed he had a right to live in the cabin based on an alleged oral sublease with the departing tenant, this arrangement was never conveyed to Rolleri or the nephew; thus, their rights, as property owner and caretaker, respectively, to permit access inside the cabin remained intact (compare People v Ponto<\/em>, 103 AD2d 573 [1984]).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Defendant never specifically addressed the issue he appealed on in the motion or the hearing so he can’t complain that the trial court did not rule on it. State v. Atchley<\/a>, 2007 Ohio 7009, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 6141 (10th Dist. December 27, 2007).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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