Nighttime knock-and-talk was coercive, particularly when the officers were inside the house asking for consent. The defendant did not have to be handcuffed to feel coerced. United States v. Reynolds, 526 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (N.D. Ga. 2007):<\/p>\n
Once in the living room, Mr. McCord and Mr. Reynolds were not free to leave. (Henry Tr. 76-77.) Though they were not in handcuffs, the court finds that there was coercive police presence at that point. The encounter took place at night, when the appearance of police officers on one’s doorstep tends to be more coercive than during the day. Ramirez-Chilel<\/em>, 289 F.3d at 751 n.8. In contrast to Deputy Henry’s earlier request to move to the living room, Deputy Henry simply told Mr. McCord and Mr. Reynolds that he was going to look through the house for Mr. Miles. (Henry Tr. 18, 53.) That the officers did not attempt to seek permission from either occupant to search the house indicates that the defendants were not able to refuse consent. Without specifically addressing the rest of the Ramirez-Chilel<\/em> factors, the totality of the circumstances indicates that Deputy Henry’s first sweep was not a consensual search, based on Deputy Henry’s acknowledgment that the men were not free to leave and the coercive way in which he informed them of, rather than requested, the search. By the time of Deputy Brown’s second sweep, both Mr. McCord and Mr. Reynolds were in handcuffs. (Id<\/em>. at 22.) The court finds that the second sweep was likewise not consensual. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n
A refusal (here asking for an attorney which was held not to be a refusal) is not required for issuance of a search warrant for blood under the Arizona implied consent statute. State v. Stanley<\/a>, 217 Ariz. 253, 172 P.3d 848 (2007):<\/p>\n
P22 Search warrants may be authorized “[w]hen property or things to be seized … constitute any evidence which tends to show that a particular public offense has been committed, or tends to show that a particular person has committed the public offense.” A.R.S. \u00a7 13-3912(4) (2001). The blood identified by the affidavit clearly meets that standard. Additionally, the statute requires that “[n]o search warrant shall be issued except on probable cause, supported by affidavit, naming or describing the person and particularly describing the property to be seized and the place to be searched.” A.R.S. \u00a7 13-3913 (2001). The affidavit here likewise meets that requirement. A refusal to take a test, though required to administratively revoke one’s driver’s license pursuant to A.R.S. \u00a7 28-1321, is not a requirement to the issuance of a search warrant in support of aggravated DUI.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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