{"id":1610,"date":"2008-12-24T08:52:10","date_gmt":"2007-12-17T14:12:38","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-12-17T14:12:38","slug":"en-US","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=1610","title":{"rendered":"Consent “protective sweep” for weapons led to validly finding marijuana in a backpack"},"content":{"rendered":"

Consent was granted to search for guns in a house, and on seeing a gun case on the floor, the officer had everybody in one room, secured it, and then “the deputy conducted a cursory search of the remaining rooms in the house, akin to a protective sweep,” and marijuana was seen in plain view in a backpack. The search did not exceed its authorized scope. United States v. Simpson<\/a>, 259 Fed. Appx. 164 (11th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished). Comment:<\/em> A cursory search for weapons seems like an oxymoron to me.<\/p>\n

Officer had a tip that the defendant had been driving down the highway smoking dope, and he found the car, smelled burnt marijuana around it, and followed tracks in the snow to an apartment. At the apartment, he asked the occupants to step outside to talk rather than going in. He had justification for a patdown, and found a knife on one, and the other consented to a frisk and the officer felt something soft and removed it, producing a baggie of marijuana. The stop and frisk were otherwise reasonable, but the case was remanded for better fact finding on the plain feel doctrine of Dickerson<\/em><\/a>, an issue of first impression in Vermont. State v. Ford<\/a>, 2007 VT 107, 182 Vt. 421, 940 A.2d 687 (2007).*<\/p>\n

Officer lied to the defendant and told him that he was having difficulty getting clearance of defendant’s license after the officer had already been told it was clear. The additional minute and eighteen seconds of the stop [and the lie] did not make the stop unreasonable when the officer asked for and got consent when the continuation was actually based on reasonable suspicion. United States v. Walton<\/a>, 258 Fed. Appx. 753, 2007 FED App. 0841N (6th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished). Comment:<\/em> The dissent blisters the officer for lying to the defendant to get consent.<\/p>\n

Seizure of plaintiff’s business computer, allegedly by consent, was not resolved by the district court, so the case was remanded for a determination of that issue. Blake v. County of Livingston<\/a>, 257 Fed. Appx. 848, 2007 FED App. 0835N (6th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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