State trial court suppression order for racial profiling in a stop was not subject to issue preclusion in a federal civil rights case because the parties and issues were not identical and the civil defendant did not get to cross-examine. The civil claim does get to proceed, however. Ballard v. Heineman, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84797 (D. Neb. November 15, 2007).*<\/p>\n
Officers put out a BOLO for a white van that a CI said would be carrying drugs. The plan was to stop the van if it committed a traffic offense. An officer saw the van, followed it, and saw a traffic offense of swerving over the fog line. The officer turned on the video and captured more of the same. Once the van was stopped, the defendant was asked for consent, and he agreed. The true motive of the stop was irrelevant because there was an objective basis. Even if the stop were invalid, the court [strains] to find the consent was purged of the taint. Alternatively, the collective knowledge of the police created reasonable suspicion for the stop. United States v. Magana-Aguirre, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84800 (W.D. Ark. November 1, 2007):<\/p>\n
Although Carver’s subjective motivation was admittedly to effect a drug-related arrest, that is irrelevant when the Court considers whether the traffic stop he carried out was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. A pattern of driving suggestive of drunk driving qualifies as a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation is occurring.<\/p>\n
. . .<\/p>\n
Finally, as noted above the Court does not find fault with Carver’s conduct in stopping the van, but even if a reviewing court should view the matter differently, this Court does not believe any court would find his conduct “flagrant” or “egregious” in any respect. Thus, the Court finds that defendant’s consent would have been sufficient to validate the search even if the traffic stop did not survive constitutional scrutiny.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading