Plaintiff exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy by shutting his bedroom door when the police were in the house, and they intruded on that expectation of privacy by shooting through the door. While the police had permission to enter from a co-tenant, the act of shutting the door still manifested an expectation of privacy in that portion of the premises that would indicate that the co-tenant did not have apparent authority as to it. Lobato v. Ford, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82373 (D. Colo. October 31, 2007):<\/p>\n
By closing the door to his bedroom, Lobato manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in his bedroom. Further, “[i]t is well-settled that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior of one’s home.” Reeves<\/em>, 484 F.3d at 1254. Under these circumstances, it is readily apparent that Lobato had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room where he was staying. The next question then is whether the officers, specifically Herrick and Ford, infringed on that expectation by opening the door to Lobato’s bedroom and firing a shot into it. This question must be answered in the affirmative based both on the physical intrusion into this room by the bullet fired from Ford’s weapon as well as the officers’ viewing of this room in a manner not available to members of the public. Compare United States v. Taylor<\/em>, 90 F.3d 903, 908 (4th Cir. 1996) (law enforcement officers did not engage in search under the Fourth Amendment by looking through picture window adjacent to front door as anyone at the front entranceway of their home could have done). I therefore conclude that the officers conducted a search of Lobato’s bedroom and must next analyze whether this search was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Officer observed what was apparently a hand to hand drug sale in a car that led him to stop the car. The officer had previously arrested the defendant for the same thing from the same car. It was thus more than a hunch. Commonwealth v. Coronel<\/a>, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 906, 875 N.E.2d 877 (2007):<\/p>\n
Considering all of the circumstances presented, it was a reasonable inference, and not a mere hunch as the motion judge suggested, that an exchange of contraband took place during the ten to fifteen second interval that Eaton was in Coronel’s car. We thus conclude that the criteria of Commonwealth v. Kennedy<\/em>, supra at 708-709, supporting probable cause were met in the present case, and we reverse the motion judge’s order insofar as it allowed the suppression of Eaton’s statements, drugs, and other evidence seized from the defendants at the scene.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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