Defendant’s handcuffing was not a minimal intrusion, and it was not based on reasonable suspicion. Taking the LaFave factors from LaFave’s Criminal Procedure<\/p>\n
(1) the particularity of the description of the offender or the vehicle in which he fled;
\n(2) the size of the area in which the offender might be found, as indicated by such facts as the elapsed time since the time occurred;
\n(3) the number of persons about in that area;
\n(4) the known or probable direction of the offender’s flight;
\n(5) observed activity by the particular person stopped; and
\n(6) knowledge or suspicion that the person or vehicle stopped has been involved in other criminality of the type presently under investigation.<\/p><\/blockquote>\nthe court, considering them seriatim, finds no reasonable suspicion. The strongest factor the court found was corn rowed hair, which the appellate court finds not subject to judicial notice that it was unusual enough to be a factor. Nervousness is also not a factor because even the innocent are nervous when they are stopped by the police. Madison-Sheppard v. State<\/a>, 177 Md. App. 165, 934 A.2d 1046 (2007). Comment:<\/em> This is kind of reminiscent of the “divide and conquer” analysis rejected in Arvizu<\/em><\/a>. Because this was an arrest without a warrant, de novo review is required under Ornelas<\/em><\/a>. Under de novo review, the appellate court is free to consider the factors itself under the totality standard. Here, the factors were found factually weak and against a finding of reasonable suspicion: race of the suspect was not particularly selective, the time since the offense under investigation was long, etc.<\/p>\n
Officers entering a house to arrest the plaintiff in a domestic violence situation were entitled to qualified immunity. It was not hot pursuit, but it was a situation for the safety of all concerned. Cannon v. Hamilton County, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81407 (E.D. Tenn. November 1, 2007), relying on Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1991).*<\/p>\n
Stop of vehicle with a temporary tag that was in the back window and not on the bumper was valid because the officer was entitled to make reasonable mistakes of fact. During the stop, the officer saw brass knuckles in plain view. The plain view was valid. United States v. Dates, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81494 (W.D. Pa. October 30, 2007).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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