A suspect has standing to challenge a search of his own person, here a patdown that led to more, even though he lacks standing to challenge a search of the place where the police found him because he was a mere visitor. The record here was devoid of a reason for the patdown, and the motion to suppress was properly granted. State v. King, 287 Ga.
\nApp. 680, 652 S.E.2d 574 (2007):<\/p>\n
The state argues only that the Kings, as visitors to the premises, had no standing to contest the search thereof. Generally, “warrantless intrusion of a person’s home is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent consent or a showing of exigent circumstances.” But the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal one and may not be asserted vicariously. Thus, “[a] person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person’s premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.” This principle, though correct, is inapposite, because, as shown above, King was aggrieved not only as a result of the search of the third person’s premises, but, in the first instance, as a result of the illegal search of his person. “A person does not lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment by entering the [home] of another.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
A murder suspect was believed to have put evidence in a garbage bag on the back porch of his trailer which was shared with others. One of the men inside was asked by the police to check it, and evidence was found. Because the garbage bag was outside and trash was gathered from multiple people, defendant cannot claim an expectation of privacy in the trash bag [even though it was on the curtilage]. The court also holds that the person who looked was not acting as an agent of the police. Hyde v. State, 13 So. 3d 997 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007).*<\/p>\n
Defendant’s prior suspended sentence included a search condition “by any law enforcement officer,” and he was searched by a law enforcement officer with knowledge of the condition. The consent to search provision was valid. Downing v. State<\/a>, 2007 Ark. App. LEXIS 643 (September 26, 2007)* (unpublished) (Comment:<\/em> Arkansas is on the verge of adopting a rule that all cases are precedent, so unpublished cases back to 1979 will be citable. Other states have similar rules, and their unpublished cases appear here as well.)<\/p>\n
Arkansas’ rule against pretextual stops did not apply because there was a valid basis for a traffic stop (broken taillight) that led to the search. Williams v. State<\/a>, 2007 Ark. App. LEXIS 642 (September 26, 2007).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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