The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine does not apply in \u00a7 1983 claims. Cannon v. Christopher, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66146 (N.D. Ind. September 6, 2007):<\/p>\n
Defendants contend that probable cause existed from the events occurring after the stop even if the initial stop was lacking reasonable suspicion and\/or probable cause as found by the state court. To this end, Defendants cite Townes v. City of New York<\/em>, 176 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1999) wherein the Second Circuit concluded that the exclusionary rule and the related doctrine of fruit of the poisonous tree did not apply to a civil rights action brought under \u00a7 1983. As is the case here, the plaintiff in Townes<\/em> was allegedly subjected to an illegal search and seizure that led to the discovery of handguns which, in turn, led to the plaintiff’s arrest, incarceration, and subsequent conviction. On appeal, the conviction was reversed and the appellate court determined that the officers lacked probable cause to stop and search him. The plaintiff then sought damages for injuries “derivative” of the search and seizure including his arrest and incarceration.<\/p>\n
According to the Townes<\/em> court, the plaintiff could not state a claim for false arrest because although the defendants lacked probable cause to stop and search him, they “certainly had probable cause to arrest him upon discovery of the handguns.” Id.<\/em> at 149. The Second Circuit explained that, “a \u00a7 1983 action, like its tort analogs, employs the principle of proximate causation,” and that adopting the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in a \u00a7 1983 action would, “impermissibly recast the relevant proximate cause injury to one of taint and attenuation” and serve to “elongate the chain of causation.” Id<\/em>. at 141. Thus, the court concluded that “the lack of probable cause to stop and search does not vitiate the probable cause to arrest.” Id<\/em>. at 149.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Defense counsel was not ineffective for not more aggressively pursuing probable cause issue because it would not have changed the outcome. Mathurin v. United States, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66055 (S.D. N.Y. September 4, 2007).*<\/p>\n
Informant privilege prevailed because the informant was not the source of information for the search. Indeed, the informant never mentioned the defendant. Kennard v. State<\/a>, 933 A.2d 1250 (Del. 2007).*<\/p>\n
Defendant subjected to a customs search en route from Atlanta to St. Thomas showed his intent to leave the customs zone. United States v. Mark, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66165 (D. V.I. September 5, 2007). (So the Virgin Islands is foreign territory?)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading