Victim of a robbery described his assailants, and, based on that, the plaintiffs were arrested. The officers had probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs, so their \u00a7 1983 case failed. As a crime victim, the officers had no duty to corroborate his account. Pierre v. City of New York, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60707 (E.D. N.Y. August 17, 2007).<\/p>\n
Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy as to an officer looking in the window of his car when it was parked in a “VIP area” of a parking lot outside a club. The Sixth Circuit had previously held that a car parked on a motel lot reserved for motel guests had no additional expectation of privacy in their cars; United States v. Carriger<\/em>, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976); and this is not different. United States v. Gooch<\/a>, 499 F.3d 596, 2007 FED App. 0334P (6th Cir. 2007).*<\/p>\n The shooting of plaintiff’s decedent was shown to be reasonable under all the circumstances, and summary judgment is granted. Chung v. Anderson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60760 (D. Neb. August 16, 2007):<\/p>\n While it may appear that some alternative course of action could have been used to isolate Garcia, or that a lesser use-of-force could have disabled Garcia, it is undisputed that the officers’ earlier use of a Taser and their repeated commands and display of weapons failed to subdue or deter Garcia, and that he did pose an immediate and serious threat to the officers’ safety at the time the shots were fired. When faced with an “hysterical” man in close quarters, screaming and yelling, and advancing on officers with a sharp boning knife, a reasonable officer on the scene could conclude that use of deadly force was necessary to prevent serious injury to one or more of the officers.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Defendant had stopped his car because his contacts were bothering him, which was plausible because he was sitting there with his contact lens case in his hand. The officer ordered him out of the car, turning the encounter into a stop without reasonable suspicion. The consent during the stop was suppressed. State v. Lanes, 287 Ga. App. 311, 651 In an IAC claim, failure to file a motion to suppress is considered a matter of trial strategy in Illinois, and it carries a presumption of correctness. To prevail, the defendant has to show that there is a reasonable probability he would prevail. Considering the stop on the merits, the defendant would not prevail, so counsel could not have been ineffective. People v. Morrison<\/a>, 2007 Ill. App. LEXIS 903 (1st Dist. August 14, 2007).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading
\nS.E.2d 456 (2007).*<\/p>\n