{"id":1264,"date":"2007-09-17T20:55:01","date_gmt":"2007-08-19T09:46:26","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-08-19T09:46:26","slug":"en-US","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=1264","title":{"rendered":"ME: Mandatory blood testing in fatal accidents constitutional"},"content":{"rendered":"

Maine holds that mandatory blood testing for intoxicants in fatal vehicle accidents does not violate the Fourth Amendment as justified by exigent circumstances and special needs. State v. Cormier<\/a>, 2007 ME 112, 928 A.2d 753 (2007):<\/p>\n

a. Inevitable Discovery and Exigent Circumstances<\/strong><\/p>\n

. . .<\/p>\n

[*P20] The exigencies that exist at the site of a fatal collision are obvious. When a serious collision, likely to involve a fatality, has just occurred, responding officers are, and should be, occupied with potentially life-saving matters that are more urgent than gathering evidence of intoxication to support the probable cause necessary for a blood test. The officers may also be responsible for assuring that the collision scene does not create greater dangers to other motorists who must travel the same road. The Legislature, in attempting to identify drivers involved in deadly accidents while intoxicated, has also taken into account the chaos inherent at the scene of a fatal, or likely fatal, accident. The statute requires immediate testing, in these narrow circumstances, without the ordinary pause to collect evidence relevant to whether alcohol or drugs might have impaired the driver.<\/p>\n

[*P21] The statute’s legislative history also demonstrates that the Legislature took into account the urgent life-and-death nature of an accident scene in crafting the mandatory drug and blood-alcohol testing legislation. …<\/p>\n

. . .<\/p>\n

[*P23] Thus, the statute requires the test in this limited situation because of “the gravity of the accident” and “the evanescent nature of evidence of intoxication.” Roche,<\/em> 681 A.2d at 474.<\/p>\n

[*P24] Having dealt with the exigencies, the Legislature then provided protections for drivers that incorporate the concepts of inevitable discovery. It did so by narrowly tailoring the statute to allow admission of those test results, in the absence of a warrant, consent, or simultaneous determination of probable cause, only when the State demonstrates probable cause to believe that the accident has resulted, or will result, in a fatality. 29-A M.R.S. \u00a7 2522(1). Further, the statute allows the admission of drug and blood-alcohol test results against a defendant only when other independent evidence, gathered before, during, or after the administration of the test, would inevitably have prompted the blood test if the police had had adequate time to investigate and were not otherwise occupied as responders to a scene involving one or more medical emergencies. 29-A M.R.S. \u00a7 2522(3); see Bento<\/em>, 600 A.2d at 1096.<\/p>\n

[*P25] The combined effect of the statutory provisions assures the following. First, the State and NHSTA will always obtain information regarding the intoxication or sobriety of drivers in fatal collisions. Second, the results of mandatory drug and blood-alcohol testing will be admissible in a criminal proceeding against a driver without violating the Fourth Amendment only when the State demonstrates that: [there is probable cause to believe the driver was under the influence or consent, etc.].<\/p>\n

. . .<\/p>\n

b. Special Needs<\/strong><\/p>\n

[*P36] Accordingly, we proceed to balance the compelling need of the State to obtain information about the intoxication of drivers involved in fatal, or likely fatal, collisions against the privacy interest of drivers, who are prohibited by law from driving while intoxicated, in the level of alcohol or other intoxicants in their blood. We conclude that the State’s interest in gathering information to assist in addressing the problem of intoxicated driving outweighs the privacy interest of drivers in the content of their blood. The State’s special needs, separate from the general purpose of law enforcement, justify an exception to the warrant requirement in these circumstances. See Skinner<\/em>, 489 U.S. at 620-21, 629-30 (holding that the railroad employee blood-testing regulations serve special needs, separate from the general need for law enforcement, to enhance railroad safety, safeguard the public, and gather information about the causes of major accidents, for purposes of prevention). <\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"pingsdone","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1264","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1264","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1264"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1264\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1264"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1264"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1264"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}