The rules of evidence do not strictly apply to suppression hearings, except as to privileges. F.R.E. 104(a). Transcripts of other proceedings were admitted because of inherent trustworthiness. United States v. Waldron, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54779 (D. S.D. July 17, 2007):<\/p>\n
In United States v. Matlock<\/em>, 415 U.S. 164, 169, 94 S. Ct. 988, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1974), the Supreme Court resolved the issue of whether hearsay from the defendant’s wife should have been admitted at the suppression hearing in the case. The Court, relying on Rule 104, held that the district court had erred by not admitting the hearsay. Matlock<\/em>, 415 U.S. at 169. In so concluding, the Court held that the rules of evidence are not applicable at suppression hearings and that otherwise inadmissible evidence can still be considered by the trial court in determining admissibility issues so long as the evidence contains some indicia of reliability. Id<\/em>. at 172-177. Rule 104, and the Court’s ruling in Matlock<\/em>, are discretionary in nature. They grant the court the discretion to dispense with the rules of evidence (except as to privileges) when the Court considers preliminary questions concerning the admissibility of evidence. See Matlock,<\/em> 415 U.S. at 172-177; Fed. R. Evid. 104(a).<\/p>\n
. . .<\/p>\n
Here, although discretionary, the court finds that transcripts offered contain sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant their consideration, and the court will accept them into evidence in ruling on this preliminary question of admissibility. The indicia of reliability include the following: defendants were present and represented by counsel at the prior hearing where the testimony was given, the defendants had a similar motivation for cross-examining the witnesses (i.e.<\/em> the suppression of evidence at a criminal trial), and the witnesses who testified did so under oath, and thus, it would have been against their penal interest to have testified falsely.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
There was probable cause to search defendant’s vehicle for evidence of a homicide, and, when it was found, the interior was wet and smelled of bleach, an apparent effort to destroy trace evidence of blood. It was towed and searched later, and blood evidence was found, but, because of the bleach, it could not be typed. State v. Weaver<\/a>, 2007 S.C. LEXIS 293 (July 30, 2007):<\/p>\n
In the instant case, there was probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the Jeep. Investigators knew that petitioner, a suspect in McKnight’s murder, had been seen driving the Jeep around the time of the murder. Upon finding the Jeep, it seemed apparent there had been an attempt to destroy evidence given the Jeep’s interior was wet and smelled of bleach. Therefore, upon finding the Jeep, the investigators could have conducted the search at that time; however, they chose to impound the vehicle.<\/p>\n
The fact investigators chose to wait to search the Jeep after it had already been impounded does not affect the propriety of the warrantless search because there is no requirement that the warrantless search of a vehicle occur contemporaneously with its lawful seizure. United States v. Johns<\/em>, 469 U.S. 478, 105 S. Ct. 881, 83 L. Ed. 2d 890 (1985) (upholding warrantless search that occurred three days after seizure). <\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Magistrate Judge properly determined Franks<\/em> by deciding that even if the court accepts defendant’s allegations as true, if he cannot prevail on that claim by undermining probable cause, the government prevails. United States v. Perez-Velazquez, 488 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D. P.R. 2007).*<\/p>\n
California holds that qualified immunity does not apply to civil rights actions under Cal. Civil Code \u00a7 52.1. Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 153 Cal. App. 4th 1230, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 741 (2d Dist. 2007).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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