Defendant was stopped for reckless driving, and he could not produce a driver’s license. The officer had the discretion to determine that merely ticketing the defendant was insufficient, and he was arrested. That led to an inventory of two dufflebags in the backseat. The arrest arguably violated Virginia law [but the court found it didn’t], and the Virginia Supreme Court recently held that would equal a Fourth Amendment violation. The law in the Fourth Circuit, however, is not that generous, and, since the case was in federal court, the Fourth Circuit cases governed. United States v. Hudson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 771 (W.D. Va. 2007):<\/p>\n
The defendant points to the recently decided case of Moore v. Commonwealth, 636 S.E.2d 395 (Va. 2006), petition for cert. filed, 2007 WL 321210 (U.S. Feb. 1, 2007) (No. 06-1082), in arguing that any arrest made in violation of Virginia law is also a violation of the Fourth Amendment. In Moore<\/em>, two police officers responded to a radio message that a motorist in the area in which they were patrolling was driving on a suspended license. After stopping the motorist, the officers determined that he was in fact driving on a suspended license, a Class One misdemeanor. Instead of issuing the motorist a summons, as required by Virginia law, they immediately placed him under arrest. Upon searching him, some fifteen minutes after placing him under arrest, they discovered sixteen grams of crack cocaine in his pocket. The Moore<\/em> court held that this evidence must be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment because a full custodial arrest of a motorist driving on a suspended license is unauthorized by Virginia law.<\/p>\n
However, Moore<\/em> is at odds with the law of this circuit. See United States v. Van Metre<\/em>, 150 F.3d 339, 347 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that district court did not err in denying motion to suppress evidence based on arrest arguably in violation of state law, because “the arrest may or may not have been conducted in accordance with [] state law is irrelevant.”). In fact, it stands in opposition to a majority of state supreme courts that have addressed the issue, see [citations omitted]. Irrespective of the Moore<\/em> court’s reasoning, the arrest in this case did not require suppression under the Fourth Amendment.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Officers had weapons drawn when they first stopped the defendant, but they were holstered when it was apparent defendant was under control. The finding of voluntariness of consent after this point was not clearly erroneous. He was not physically restrained and he was informed of his right to refuse consent. United States v. Mendoza<\/a>, 245 Fed. Appx. 351 (5th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).<\/p>\n
After receiving numerous complaints about drug dealing at defendant’s address, officers conducted a knock-and-talk, and the defendant validly consented to the entry into his bedroom which revealed firearms. United States v. Jones<\/a>, 242 Fed. Appx. 175 (5th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).<\/p>\n
Police had reasonable suspicion for a stop of defendant for prior knowledge of his driving on a suspended license. It was reconfirmed, and he was stopped. Then the defendant gave a false name, and that led to his arrest and a search. United States v. Cottman, 497 F. Supp. 2d 598 (D. Del. 2007).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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