Officers’ reliance on an apparently invalid under state law, but facially valid, “violation of court order” (VCO) arrest was saved by the good faith exception. The officers used the order to make an arrest by getting defendant to open his front door, not enter the house. None of the exceptions to the good faith exception applied to this arrest. The factual basis for the VCO was explored at the hearing to show its basis. The issuing state judge did not abandon his judicial role, and it was not so facially deficient that it could not be relied upon. The VCO was treated like an arrest warrant, and it was not used as a search warrant. United States v. Floyd, 247 Fed. Appx. 161 (11th Cir. 2007) (unpublished):<\/p>\n
Here, Floyd’s assertion that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by inducing McCray to open the front door without consent is meritless. It is noteworthy that Floyd is not arguing that the officers gained non-consensual entry into his home, but rather that they induced a non-consensual opening of his front door. However, it is not unconstitutional for an officer to approach an individual’s home and knock on the door when the officer has an arrest warrant for that individual. See, e.g., United States v. Bervaldi<\/em>, 226 F.3d 1256, 1263, 1267 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that police officers did not violate a person’s Fourth Amendment rights by entering the person’s home where the officers had an arrest warrant for a suspect, went to the address that they believed was the suspect’s home, believed the suspect was inside the home, knocked on the door, and later entered the house); see also Payton v. New York,<\/em> 445 U.S. 573, 602-03, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1388, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (holding that, once an arrest warrant has been issued, it is constitutionally reasonable to require the suspect to open the doors of his home to police officers because “for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within”). …<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Alaska again avoids having to decide whether to follow Whren<\/em> on pretext stops because this stop was not pretextual. Morgan v. State, 162 P.3d 636 (Alas. App. 2007):<\/p>\n
We did not have to resolve this issue in Nease, and we conclude that we need not resolve this issue in Morgan’s case either. Even if we were to adopt a “pretext stop” limitation on traffic stops, that doctrine would not apply to the facts of Morgan’s case.<\/p>\n
We reach this conclusion mainly because we disagree with Morgan’s contention that DUI enforcement was an “improper motivation” for the stop of Morgan’s vehicle. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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