Knock and talk led to finding of crack on the table. The defendant did not live there, and it was held that his business relationship with the owner denied him standing. United States v. Gray, 491 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 2007):<\/p>\n
The Fourth Amendment’s protections do not attach to every visitor. For not every visitor “merely present with the consent of the householder” has a legitimate expectation of privacy. Carter<\/em>, 525 U.S. at 90. It is rather a foundational principle that “not all persons in the company of the property owner have the owner’s right to assert the spatial protection.” Id.<\/em> at 99 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Fourth Amendment is not so broad as to encompass “anyone legitimately on the premises where a search occurs.” Id.<\/em> at 90; see also Rakas<\/em>, 439 U.S. at 147-48. Thus, a temporary visitor to a residence–perhaps the mailman or pizza deliverer–cannot generally claim the Fourth Amendment’s protections. See, e.g., Carter<\/em>, 525 U.S. at 90; Terry v. Martin<\/em>, 120 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 1997). <\/p>\n
In Minnesota v. Carter<\/em>, the Supreme Court held that visitors who were “essentially present for a business transaction” had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment of a third party. 525 U.S. at 90; see also United States v. Rhiger<\/em>, 315 F.3d 1283, 1286 (10th Cir. 2003) (interpreting Carter to create “a clear distinction between the status of individuals present at a residence for social purposes and those present for business or commercial matters”); United States v. Gamez-Orduno,<\/em> 235 F.3d 453, 458 (9th Cir. 2000) (interpreting Carter to hold that “[a]n individual whose presence on another’s premises is purely commercial in nature … has no legitimate expectation of privacy in that location”).<\/p>\n
. . .<\/p>\n
The distinction between business and social guests also draws upon the fact that a social host often shares not only his home but also his privacy with his guest. See Olson, 495 U.S. at 99. Many social guests entrust their hosts with the safety and security of both their persons and their belongings. An overnight guest, for example, seeks shelter in another’s home “precisely because it provides him with privacy, a place where he and his possessions will not be disturbed.” Id.<\/em> The same generally cannot be said of business visitors. Often strangers with little or no connection to a residence, business associates may or may not have reasons for mutual trust. To expand the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment to cover any such caller, does not map onto “the everyday expectations of privacy that we all share.” Id.<\/em> at 98.<\/p>\n
The facts of this case suggest that Askew was a business, not a social, guest.fn3 There can be no doubt that at the time of his arrest Askew was using Gray’s apartment to traffic in drugs. <\/p>\n
fn3 Askew, of course, maintained a legitimate expectation of privacy in his person within Gray’s residence. Accordingly, Askew has “standing” to challenge the pat down search of his person. But searches incident to lawful arrest are a long-standing exception to the warrant requirement. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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