The facts that support a Fifth Amendment takings claim can also support a Fourth Amendment seizure claim. Gonzalez v. City Plan Comm’n, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46520 (N.D. Tex. June 26, 2007):<\/p>\n
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants effected an unreasonable seizure of their property in violation of the Fourth Amendment, by selling the abandoned right-of-way and the surplus land to the Congregation, and by approving the Congregation’s application to replat its property. The Fourth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. A seizure of property occurs “when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” United States v. Lovell,<\/em> 849 F.2d 910, 915 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen,<\/em> 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). Defendants move for summary judgment against Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim, arguing that no unreasonable seizure occurred. In support, Defendants argue that no law supports Plaintiffs’ apparent position that the sale and replatting of nearby property can constitute an unreasonable seizure of Plaintiffs’ property. The Court agrees. Seizures are frequently found when a complainant’s physical property is either actually taken or damaged by state action. See, e.g., Pepper v. Village of Oak Park,<\/em> 430 F.3d 805, 809 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs had no possessory interest in the property that was sold to the Congregation, and have failed to demonstrate, in response to Defendants’ contentions, that any economic injury to their property resulted, or that such injury would be unreasonable in light of state and local law that allows the challenged actions. The Court thus GRANTS summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ \u00a7 1983 claim based on the Fourth Amendment.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Plaintiff stated a possible claim for relief under \u00a7 1983 for errors in his mental health records that keep him confined. Pecou v. Forensic Comm. Pers., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46651 (E.D. N.Y. June 18, 2007).*<\/p>\n
Traffic stop was justified, but reasonable suspicion developed during the stop. The officer “testified that his suspicions were aroused because: 1) Dominguez was the sole occupant of the RV; 2) Dominguez could not remember the name of the friend whose wedding he attended after driving cross-country in an RV; 3) he was extraordinarily nervous [carotid artery throbbing]; 4) he exited the interstate at an interchange with no apparent commercial establishments or signs indicating that such were present, ostensibly to re-fuel when he still had half a tank of gas; and 5) the RV emitted a strong scent of deodorizers which are typically used to mask the presence of illegal narcotics. These circumstances suffice to warrant Crain’s suspicion, based on his experience as a law enforcement officer, that Dominguez was transporting illegal substances.” United States v. Dominguez, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46385 (W.D. La. May 21, 2007).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading