State law enforcement officers’ extrajurisdictional activites in participating in a search did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. A state law violation does not equate with a Fourth Amendment violation. United States v. Nure, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43974 (E.D. Mo. June 18, 2007).<\/p>\n
In Washington State, it does not violate the state constitution either. State v. Barron, 139 Wn. App. 266, 160 P.3d 1077 (2007).<\/p>\n
Pro se arrestee sued under \u00a7 1983 for immediate release on state charges, which the district court found barred by Younger<\/em> absention. Green v. Kingsport Police Dept., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43925 (E.D. Tenn. June 15, 2007):<\/p>\n Under the doctrine established by Younger v. Harris<\/em>, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), federal courts must abstain from entertaining lawsuits by an individual seeking to enjoin a criminal prosecution against him in state court where those proceedings implicate important state interests and the plaintiff has an adequate opportunity to raise his challenges in that forum. See O’Shea v. Littleton,<\/em> 414 U.S. 488, 499-504 (1974). All of the factors supporting abstention are present here. Therefore, the Court must abstain from interfering in plaintiff’s state criminal proceedings by issuing rulings as to whether the warrantless entry into the plaintiff’s room, seizure of his property, and subsequent arrest violated his constitutional rights.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Defendant was on probation, and he had to make his computer available to his PO. The PO with “consent” looked at the computer and found “inappropriate if not illegal” images, so he went to the police for further guidance. The PO came back with the police and defendant further consented to a search of the computer. The search of the computer was not by consent. State v. White, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 82 (June 7, 2007):<\/p>\n This entry was without the express permission of the defendant. White and two others were ordered to sit in the television viewing area “as a safety precaution” and one of the four troopers was assigned to watch the three civilians. White was not allowed to accompany the State Police to his back bedroom or observe what the officers did with respect to his computer. A man of limited intelligence and education, who is unable to take care of his ordinary everyday affairs without constant help, was now surrounded by six law enforcement officers in his home. He was not allowed to move from his living room area and was described by the man who knows him best as nervous, tense and “actually scared.” <\/p>\n Trooper Borek was obviously not trained in the area of investigating child pornography offenses. He had one of the other troopers call their supervisor for instructions. The troopers on the scene were instructed to seize the computer if they could get “consent.” Apparently no serious consideration was given to collecting the facts known about the defendant and the computer’s contents in support of a search warrant application. No consent form was offered to the defendant to memorialize his informed decision to consent to a seizure of his computer. <\/p>\n Moreover, when asked by Trooper Borek if he would consent to the seizure of his computer, Borek told White that if he did not consent to the removal of his computer, the police would just get a warrant and stay in White’s trailer until they obtained it. <\/p>\n Considering the totality of the pertinent facts and circumstances, this Court cannot conclude that the state has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the verbal consent by White was freely and voluntarily given. [Although the standard may be clear and convincing, the preponderance standard was not satisfied.]<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Defense counsel would not be ineffective for not pursuing a motion to suppress that could not win. King v. Runnels, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43884 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2007).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading