A Utah officer observed a pickup truck with excessive window tinting, and he stopped it. During the stop, the officer learned of a “skelton file” on defendant for not having a U.S. license during a stop in Arizona. The window tinting justified a search incident because it was a class C misdemeanor in Utah. United States v. Velasquez-Rojo, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40092 (D. Utah June 1, 2007).<\/p>\n
Alleged exigency for entry into premises from defendant’s use of his cellphone just as he was being arrested was belied by the fact the officers did not enter for two hours. United States v. De Arias, 510 F. Supp. 2d 969 (M.D. Fla. 2007):<\/p>\n
Even assuming the agents did see Jenkins holding and manipulating a cell phone, at best, any exigency created by this alleged phone call was stale when the Agents arrived at the Residence about 2 hours later. TR at 189. Furthermore, exigency must be supported by facts, and Agent Locher testified that he was not aware of any unusual activity at the Residence between the time of the traffic stop and the time of the knock and talk, and that he did not know if anyone at the Residence had been “tipped off.” TR at 100. None of the other Agents provided any evidence to the contrary.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Defendant was driving without seatbelts in a high crime area, so the officer decided to stop him because of their “professional relationship.” [“I knew him [Mr. Bowers] on a professional basis, figured I could get more of a story, more of what’s going on from him.”] The officer asked the defendant about weapons and drugs, and conducted a patdown that led to a gun. While an alleged seatbelt violation is subject to abuse, this one was objectively reasonable.
\nBecause of the late hour and place and knowledge of the defendant, “[i]n the circumstances, therefore, it was not unreasonable for Officer Stringer, an experienced officer, to simply ask whether either the driver or passenger had drugs or weapons in their possession and whether they would consent to a search.” United States v. Bowers, 490 F. Supp. 2d 285 (D. Conn. 2007).*<\/p>\nWhile the same police conduct could lead a court to suppress a consent but not suppress a statement, compare United States v. Betters,<\/em> 229 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (D. Ore. 2002), this is not such a case. The consent to search was shown to be voluntary as was the statement. United States v. Jennings, 491 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (M.D. Ala. 2007).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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