One who is a mere party to an email conversation doesn\u2019t have standing to challenge its seizure from another. United States v. Young, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178284 (D. Utah December 17, 2013):<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
The 502 Warrants<\/p>\n
Co-Defendants Mr. Lustyik and Mr. Thaler Do Not Have Standing to Challenge the Warrants in the 502 Case.<\/em><\/p>\n
As parties to the e-mails obtained from AISC’s computers and the Internet service provider (ISP), America Online, Inc., Mr. Lustyik and Mr. Thaler claim that they have standing because they had a subjective and reasonable privacy interest in the e-mail conversations which they were having with their Co-Defendants. Recognizing that they would not have standing if the message had been transported through traditional mail, Mr. Lustyik and Mr. Thaler argue that e-mail and text-message conversations should be distinguished from correspondence by traditional mail because “e[-]mail is non-tangible and provides a platform for communication which, although asynchronous, bares more similarity to a face-to-face meeting or a telephone call than traditional mail.” They further argue that the instantaneous nature of e-mails makes them more comparable to telephone calls: “Whereas the expectation of privacy may be lost upon delivery of a traditional letter, the expectation of privacy in an e[-]mail conversation continues throughout the discussion (similar to a phone call)” and therefore the interception of such a communication violates the privacy interests of all parties involved in the conversation.<\/p>\n
But the defendants are wrong as a matter of law. A sender of an e-mail loses his or her reasonable expectation of privacy in an e-mail that has actually reached the intended recipient. Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (An individual may not “enjoy [] an expectation of privacy in transmissions over the Internet or e-mail that have already arrived at the recipient”). “The e-mailer would be analogous to a letter-writer, whose ‘expectation of privacy ordinarily terminates upon delivery’ of the letter.” Guest, 255 F.3d at 333 (quoting United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995). In Warshak v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit analogized a search and seizure of e-mails through an ISP to the interception of a letter at a post office. 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010). Here, transmission of all the e-mails and texts was complete before seizure, that is, the e-mails had already arrived at the intended recipient account. Any reasonable expectation of privacy Mr. Lustyik and Mr. Thaler may have had in their e-mails ended when Mr. Taylor received the messages in his and AISC’s e-mail accounts.<\/p>\n
Because the three 502 warrants were directed at electronic information which was either property of Mr. Taylor or property of AISC of which Mr. Taylor is the sole owner, the court finds that only Mr. Taylor and AISC would have standing to challenge their searches. Mr. Lustyik and Mr. Thaler both lack the ability to challenge the 502 warrants and subsequent searches and seizures. See e.g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369, 88 S. Ct. 2120, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1154 (1968).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading