Whether, under Georgia v. Randolph, a defendant must be personally present and objecting when police officers ask a co-tenant for consent to conduct a warrantless search or whether a defendant’s previously stated objection, while physically present, to a warrantless search is a continuing assertion of 4th Amendment rights which cannot be overridden by a co-tenant.

Opinion below: People v. Fernandez, 208 Cal.App.4th 100, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 51 (2d Dist. 2012), posted here as Cal.2: Police can remove defendant and ask for consent from co-tenant; rejecting 9th Cir. authority.

For what it is worth, this is on the petition of the citizen accused which suggests, but does not guarantee, a reversal. After all, can the police really just circumvent Randolph by removing the objector then asking around for consent until they find an unaware third party to ask? Come on...

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The search warrant affidavit here did in fact show a sufficient connection to defendant and a robbery murder for there to be probable cause. The victim’s blood on his sock was admissible. Commonwealth v. Almonte, 2013 Mass. LEXIS 343 (May 20, 2013).*

Defendant was standing next to his car with the door open into traffic with a 40 oz bottle in his hand. An unmarked car stopped. The officer had at least PC that defendant had an open container. When he saw it was the police, he made a furtive movement to his waist suggesting a gun. The office moved toward him, and he attempted to flee, getting only three steps before being tackled. His attempted frisk was valid. United States v. Terry, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 10167 (3d Cir. May 21, 2013).*

Defendant’s girlfriend was a cousin of a police officer investigating defendant, and she freely and voluntarily consented to search of her place finding stuff to use against defendant. State v. Blevins, 2013 W. Va. LEXIS 503 (May 20, 2013).*

The credibility on consent goes to the officers stopping defendant because the stop was based on a burned out brake light, something disprovable by a cell phone picture that anybody could take (but nobody did). If they wanted to come up with a bogus reason for the stop, it would have been something not provable at all, like crossing the centerline or not coming to a complete stop. United States v. Kelley, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71785 (E.D. Ark. May 21, 2013).*

Co-defendant passenger had standing to challenge the stop (which was valid) but not the search of the vehicle owned and driven by another. United States v. Desjardin, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70770 (D. Nev. May 17, 2013).*

News that federal authorities had apparently looked at the personal email of the chief Washington correspondent for Fox News under a search warrant secretly obtained in a criminal investigation of his 2009 news-gathering activities elicited outrage Monday from media organizations and others,

After listening to two months of testimony on the New York Police Department’s stop-and-frisk practices, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin left little doubt about her views of their effectiveness in helping detect criminal behavior.

“A lot of people are being frisked or searched on suspicion of having a gun and nobody has a gun,” Judge Scheindlin, of Federal District Court in Manhattan, said on Monday during closing arguments in the trial. “So the point is: the suspicion turns out to be wrong in most of the cases.”