Post details: W.D.Pa.: By using neighbor's wireless router, defendant had no REP in his signal

11/16/12

Permalink 08:07:40 am, by fourth, 541 words, 235 views   English (US)
Categories: General

W.D.Pa.: By using neighbor's wireless router, defendant had no REP in his signal

Defendant used the Moocherhunter™ software to cause his computer to use another person’s wireless router. Following the rationale of the pen register case (Smith), the court finds that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a wireless signal sent to a computer outside his own home to procure child pornography off the internet. United States v. Stanley, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162317 (W.D. Pa. November 14, 2012):

5. Here, the issue is whether a search occurred when Erdely used Moocherhunter™ to follow the wireless signal being sent from and to the computer identified by the 95 MAC address in order to connect to Kozikowski's wireless router. More specifically, the court must determine whether Stanley had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the wireless signal he caused to emanate from the computer in his home to Kozikowski's wireless router and the wireless signal he received back from Kozikowski's wireless router in order to connect to the internet.

. . .

11. Based upon Smith's rationale, the court finds Stanley did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the wireless signal he caused to emanate from his computer to the Kozikowski wireless router or in the signal being sent from the router back to his computer, and therefore, Erdely's use of Moocherhunter™ did not constitute a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In Smith, the pen register was used to record the telephone numbers people voluntarily dialed and thus, conveyed, to the telephone company by monitoring electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone was released. Here, Moocherhunter™ monitored the strength of a signal that Stanley voluntarily caused to send from his computer to Kozikowski's wireless router and to receive a signal back from the wireless router in order to gain unauthorized access to Kozikowski's internet connection. In both cases, the party seeking suppression of evidence assumed the risk that information disclosed to a third party may be turned over to the police. Notably, Moocherhunter™, like the pen register, did not reveal the contents of the communications; it only revealed that communications were taking place.

12. The court finds that Stanley did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the wireless signal he caused to emanate from his computer to Kozikowski's wireless router or the wireless signal he received from Kozikowski's wireless router in order to connect to the internet. The information logged on that wireless router was accessible to Kozikowski and through his consent, to Erdely. This information showed the private IP address of Stanley's computer. Stanley, therefore, could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the signal he was sending to or receiving from Kozikowski's wireless router in order to connect to the internet. An internet subscriber does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address or the information he provides to his Internet Service Provider, such as Comcast, in order to legally establish an internet connection, and likewise, a person connecting to another person's wireless router does not have an expectation of privacy in that connection, i.e. the private IP address, when it is available to that third person and anyone with whom that person shares the information.

See Who's Stealing Your Wireless Signal by Derek Gerry on Life123.com.

Update: See Volokh by Orin Kerr.

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