Police ruse, a complete lie, to get consent to enter at 4 a.m. made consent coerced. The police wanted to do a knock-and-talk, but they knew that the defendant would never agree to let them in to look for drugs. They also knew they lacked PC. So, they made up a rape allegation, and knocked on the door and told the occupants that it was alleged that a rape occurred and they wanted to look around to make sure that this was not the place described by the "victim." They used that as a pretext to get inside to make a plain view. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed (no citation on Lexis, but it is on Westlaw: Krause v. Commonwealth, 2004 WL 2414011 (Ky. App. October 29, 2004) (unpublished)), but the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed. If they did not suppress this search, they noted that citizens would be less inclined to cooperate with police in the future; this was exploitation of civic duty. Krause v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 922 (Ky. 2006) (This opinion is well worth reading because of the astute balancing of policy questions, but getting it for free is another matter. To say the Kentucky S.Ct.'s website is not remotely user friendly is an understatement; in fact, it sucks. To get the opinion, click the "website" link in the previous sentence, then click on "Supreme Court cases" and enter "Krause" as a search term; you get a .pdf but not a ready link; it is the second link, case 2004-SC-1009; the first link is the court of appeals decision from October 29, 2004):

In this case, Trooper Manar confronted Appellant and his roommate at an alarming hour (4:00 a.m.) with unnerving news -- a young girl had just been raped and he needed to look around the house in order to determine if it was the place that she had described to police. Stunned and sure that they were not the perpetrators of this heinous crime (since in fact, it never occurred), Appellant and his roommate made a split second decision to allow Trooper Manar into the residence in order to assist the trooper in his investigation. The trooper testified, and the trial court found that Appellant and his roommate would have never consented to the search if they knew the trooper's true purpose. Furthermore, Trooper Manar had no legal right, independent of receiving some kind of valid consent, to enter or search the home. Under these unique circumstances, we believe that the ruse utilized by Trooper Manar absolutely undermined the purposes inherent in requiring consent to be voluntarily obtained without any implied or express coercion.

Our belief that Appellant's consent to search was coerced is based on several factors. First, given the time and nature of the trooper's ruse, we believe that Appellant and his roommate were in a particularly vulnerable state. A knock on the door at 4:00 a.m. by uniformed police officers is a frightening event in and of itself. Couple this knock with a heinous and shameful accusation, such as the rape of a young girl, and nearly any person would feel overwhelmed and stunned.

Second, Trooper Manar's tactics were unnecessary in this instance and not based on any pressing or imminent tactical considerations. In contrast, the ruse utilized by the police in Adcock was primarily employed for safety reasons and to avoid the destruction of evidence that commonly takes place when entry into a home for the purposes of executing a search warrant is delayed or hindered.

Finally, we believe that if the type of ruse utilized by Trooper Manar was sanctioned by this Court, citizens would be discouraged from "aiding to the utmost of their ability in the apprehension of criminals" since they would have no way of knowing whether their assistance was being called upon for the public good or for the purpose of incriminating them. Schneckloth, supra, at 243, 93 S.Ct. at 2056 (internal quotation omitted). Moreover, widespread use of this type of tactic could quickly undermine "the set of values reflecting society's deeply felt belief that the criminal law cannot be used as an instrument of unfairness." Id. at 225, 93 S.Ct. at 2046.

We are careful to note that our holding is limited and narrow. We do not hold that the use of ruses, in general, is unconstitutional. ...

. . .

What distinguishes this case most, perhaps, from the bulk of other ruse cases is the fact that Trooper Manar exploited a citizen's civic desire to assist police in their official duties for the express purpose of incriminating that citizen. The use of this particular ruse simply crossed the line of civilized notions of justice and cannot be sanctioned without vitiating the long established trust and accord our society has placed with law enforcement.

Arrest warrant for probation violation coupled with PC to believe the defendant was in the place where he lived with others was sufficient under Alaska's interpretation of Payton to permit an entry by police, even though the rights of third persons would be involved. [That is a consequence of the person named in the warrant living with others, I'm afraid.] This case arose in connection with a hindering prosecution where the act that led to the warrant was not even a separate crime.] Anderson v. State, 145 P.3d 617 (Alaska App. October 20, 2006):

Case law from around the country supports the view that, in situations like the Andersons' case, an arrest warrant alone (coupled with a reasonable belief that the person named in the warrant is currently in the residence) authorizes the police to enter the suspect's own home to execute the warrant, regardless of whether the suspect has co-residents. The suspect need not be the owner of the dwelling.

We, too, adopt this view of the law. Accordingly, because the troopers had a warrant for Daniel Anderson's arrest, the troopers needed no additional warrant to enter the residence that Daniel shared with his parents, so long as the troopers had probable cause to believe that Daniel was inside that residence.

Somewhat similar is Sublett v. Commonwealth, 203 S.W.3d 701 (Ky. October 19, 2006), where a parolee lived with his mother, and she was found to have consented to the entry that led to her son's arrest and conviction. Aside from the authority to enter, the parole officer also had the authority to search defendant's backpack and jeans under the parole conditions. (Also, a parole officer has statutory authority to arrest in Kentucky.)

Two traffic stops led to two informants giving information against the defendant that police substantially corroborated and put into an affidavit for the search warrant. Reliability was shown in the affidavit. Olden v. Commonwealth, 203 S.W.3d 672 (Ky. October 19, 2006).*