Post details: D.Ore.: Keeping child pornography on a wireless network accessible to anyone showed no REP

02/03/10

Permalink 07:31:51 am, by fourth, 825 words, 227 views   English (US)
Categories: General

D.Ore.: Keeping child pornography on a wireless network accessible to anyone showed no REP

Defendant’s computer was set to share files on his wireless network. A neighbor’s wireless router failed, and her computer which regularly shared files, too, automatically picked up defendant’s system, and she saw folders indicative of child pornography. The defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the files that could be shared by anybody who accessed his wireless network. United States v. Ahrndt, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7821 (D. Ore. January 28, 2010):

A. Diminished Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Data Broadcast via Unsecured Wireless Network Router

At the suppression hearing, defendant argued that a wireless network should be given no less protection than a hardwired network under the Fourth Amendment. According to defendant, if, hypothetically, defendant had possessed a hardwired home network, and officer McCullough had obtained access to defendant's computer via the hardwired network, there would no question that his access violated a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Courts, however, have long held that different communications hardware and technologies carry different reasonable expectations of privacy. For example, while users of traditional hardwired phones generally have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their conversations, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967), users of cordless phones generally do not because of the ease of intercepting wireless transmissions. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir. 1973) (particular speakers on radio telephones knew they could be overheard, and thus had no justifiable expectation of privacy); Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705, 706-07 (8th Cir. 1989) (no justifiable expectation of privacy in conversations on cordless telephone); United States v. Hoffa, 436 F.2d 1243, 1247 (7th Cir. 1970) (no expectation of privacy for conversation over mobile telephones under Fourth Amendment analysis); Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Supp. 584, 589 (M.D. La. 1986) (no privacy expectation for conversation "broadcast by radio in all directions to be overheard by countless people"); State v. DeLaurier, 488 A.2d 688, 694 (R.1.1985) (phone came with manual alerting owner that conversation could be transmitted to others);

In the leading case on the subject, Tyler, the Berodt family discovered that their cordless telephone could intercept the cordless phone conversations of Scott Tyler, who lived four houses down the street. 877 F.2d at 705. ... In so holding, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the expectation of privacy in wireless phones is different from that of wired phones because the practical realities of the different technologies give rise to varied subjective and objective expectations.

The expectation of privacy in cordless phones is analogous to the expectation of privacy in wireless networks, because wireless networks are so easily intercepted. Wireless networks are similar to cordless phones in that they transmit data over radio waves. James Ridge, What Happens When Everything Becomes Connected: The Impact on Privacy When Technology Becomes Pervasive, 49 S. Tex. L. Rev. 725, 735 (2008). Unlike cordless phone signals, however, a wireless router signal can be received by an unauthorized user even though that user will not usually encounter personal or confidential information. Daniel Kamitaki, Beyond E-mail: Threats to Network Security and Privileged Information for the Modern Law Firm, 15 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 307, 340 (2006). By using the wireless network signal for internet access, a joyrider 1 is not made privy to personal information of the broadcasting user. Ned Snow, The Law of Computer Trespass: Cyber Security or Virtual Entrapment?, 2007 Ark. L. Notes 109, 110 (2007). Information transmitted to and from the internet is invisible to the other user of a Wi-Fi signal. Id. In addition, most joyriders assume that using another person's unsecured wireless connection is entirely legal, Kamitaki, supra at 340-41, and experts have pronounced it ethical. Randy Cohen, The Ethicist: Wi-Fi Fairness, N. Y. Times, Feb. 8, 2004, at 6, available at 2004 WLNR 5575601. In any event, accidental unauthorized use of other people's wireless networks is a fairly common occurrence in densely populated urban environments. Kamitaki, supra at 341. Purposeful unauthorized use is perhaps equally ubiquitous, because, as one high-technology researcher put it, "Wi-Fi is in the air, and it is a very low curb, if you will, to step up and use it." Michel Marriott, Hey Neighbor. Stop Piggybacking on My Wireless, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 2006, at 11, available at 2006 WLNR 3698466.

1 A "joyrider" is someone who "use[s] an open Wi-Fi connection to access the Internet." Benjamin Kern, Whacking. Joyriding, and War-Driving: Roaming Use of Wi-Fi and the Law, 21 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 101, 138 (2004).

Here, defendant used a Belkin54G wireless router to blanket his house and the surrounding area with wireless internet. He did not password-protect the wireless network, so any person within range could access it. JH had accessed the Belkin54G router multiple times. At the hearing, special agent Tony Onstadt testified that although the default setting of the Belkin54G router is not to have password protection, the router comes with a manual that includes detailed instructions on how to password-protect the router. According to his testimony, the manual stresses the importance of password protection. Agent Onstadt also testified that the range of the router was up to 400 feet in the shape of a donut around the house.

Pingbacks:

No Pingbacks for this post yet...

FourthAmendment.com

Notes on Use

September 2010
Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat
<< <     
      1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15 16 17 18
19 20 21 22 23 24 25
26 27 28 29 30    

Search

© 2003-10
Online since Feb. 24, 2003

To search Search and Seizure on Lexis.com $
Contact / About

 www.johnwesleyhall.com
 www.LawofCriminalDefense.com

Fourth Amendment cases,
citations, and links
[New]

Latest Slip Opinions:
U.S. Supreme Court
(Home)
Federal Appellate Courts
  First Circuit
  Second Circuit
  Third Circuit
  Fourth Circuit
  Fifth Circuit
  Sixth Circuit
  Seventh Circuit
  Eighth Circuit
  Ninth Circuit
  Tenth Circuit
  Eleventh Circuit
  D.C. Circuit
  Military Courts: C.A.A.F., Army, AF, N-M, CG
State courts

Google Scholar
Advanced Google Scholar
Google search tips
LexisWeb
LII State Appellate Courts
LexisONE free caselaw
Findlaw Free Opinions

Most recent SCOTUS cases:
2010-11 Term:
  None yet

2009-10 Term:
  Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 175 L. Ed. 2d 410, decided Dec. 7 (per curiam) (ScotusWiki)
  City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 177 L. Ed. 2d 216, decided June 17 (ScotusWiki)


2008-09 Term:
  Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496, decided Jan. 13 (ScotusWiki)
  Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565, decided Jan. 21 (ScotusWiki)
  Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694, decided Jan. 26 (ScotusWiki)
  Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485, decided April 21 (ScotusWiki)
  Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 174 L. Ed. 2d 354, decided June 25 (ScotusWiki)


Research Links:
  Supreme Court:
  SCOTUSBlog
  SCOTUSWiki
  S. Ct. Docket
  Solicitor General's site
  SCOTUSreport
  Briefs online (but no amicus briefs) 
  Curiae (Yale Law)
  Oyez Project (NWU)
  "On the Docket"–Medill
  S.Ct. Monitor: Law.com
  S.Ct. Com't'ry: Law.com

  General (many free):
  LexisWeb
  Google Scholar | Google
  LexisOne Legal Website Directory
  Crimelynx
  Lexis.com $
  Lexis.com (criminal law/ 4th Amd) $
  Findlaw.com
  Findlaw.com (4th Amd)
  Westlaw.com $
  F.R.Crim.P. 41
  www.fd.org

  DOJ Computer Search Manual
  USSS computer search website


  ACLU on privacy
  Privacy Foundation
  Electronic Privacy Information Center
  Criminal Appeal (post-conviction) (9th Cir.)
  Section 1983 Blog

"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).

"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today."
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property."
Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)

"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment."
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)

"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable."
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)

"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)

“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)

“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)

"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards

"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]

“You know, most men would get discouraged by now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
Pepé LePew

"There is never enough time, unless you are serving it."
Malcolm Forbes

"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)

XML Feeds

What is RSS?

Who's Online?

  • Guest Users: 45

powered by
b2evolution