Defendant has no standing to challenge alleged HIPAA violation of his victim in producing records for trial. And, there was no violation. United States v. Prentice, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9701 (D. Minn. January 15, 2010).

The officer had reasonable suspicion that defendant had guns and drugs in the car when he stopped him, and that justified asking for consent. United States v. Smith, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9624 (D. Minn. January 14, 2010).*

Two controlled buys by a CI off defendant at his house was PC for a search warrant for the house. United States v. Neal, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9609 (D. Minn. January 13, 2010).*

Public Interest(s) and Fourth Amendment Enforcement by Alex Reinert of Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, to be published in the University of Illinois Law Review. Abstract:

Fourth Amendment events – the recent arrest of Harvard professor Henry Louis Gates, Jr. is one of many examples–-generate substantial controversy among the public and in the legal community. Yet there is orthodoxy to Fourth Amendment thinking, reflected in the near universal assumption by courts and commentators alike that the Amendment creates only tension between privately-held individual liberties and public-regarding interests in law enforcement and security. On this account, courts are faced with a clear choice when mediating Fourth Amendment conflicts: side with the individual by declaring a particular intrusion to be in violation of the Constitution or side with the public by permitting the intrusion. Scholarly literature and court decisions are accordingly littered with references to the “costs” to society of enforcing the Fourth Amendment in favor of individual claimants. Taking the “public interest” seriously in this framework predictably favors government intrusions.

This Article challenges this dichotomous approach to Fourth Amendment interpretation by identifying a new dimension of the public’s interest: important collective values that are in harmony rather than in tension with individual liberties. The multidimensional approach advanced here recognizes that there are many kinds of public interests, some of which are advanced and some of which are impeded by Fourth Amendment intrusions. Drawing on First Amendment and Due Process Clause jurisprudence, empirical data, and historical materials, this Article uses as examples two categories of collective interests – participatory pluralism and efficient and accurate administration of the criminal justice system – that are implicated by Fourth Amendment questions, but are ignored by the Court’s current jurisprudence. If the Court is to take the public’s interest seriously, it needs a Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that takes account of these interests, among others, and acknowledges the reality that the “public interest” is multifaceted.

A police reality show videotaped plaintiff in secure areas of the jail after her arrest, and she sued the network which was showing it. She stated enough to hold in the media defendants under Wilson v. Layne. Frederick v. Biography Channel, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9743 (N.D. Ill. February 4, 2010).*

A person who says she lives in a dwelling and has keys is a person who can be asked for consent.
United States v. White, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9494 (E.D. Mich. February 4, 2010).*

“Can I ask you a few more questions” after a traffic stop is not a seizure. United States v. Barraza-Martinez, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 2374 (10th Cir. February 4, 2010) (unpublished):

Both defendants rely heavily on Sandoval, in which the Tenth Circuit held the officer's response of "No, wait a minute," to the motorist's question "That's it?" rendered the subsequent questioning non-consensual. Id. at 542. The present case, however, is distinguishable from Sandoval on two grounds. Unlike Sandoval, Deputy Bentley indicated the original investigative detention was terminated by handing Barraza-Martinez a copy of the warning citation and stating he was free to go. Barraza-Martinez then began opening the patrol car door, demonstrating he understood he was free to leave. Deputy Bentley's subsequent question, "Hey, William, can I ask you a few more questions?" did not retract Barraza-Martinez's freedom to leave the patrol car. Unlike the "No, wait a minute" directive at issue in Sandoval, Deputy Bentley's question, along with his earlier statement that Barraza-Martinez was free to go, served to give a reasonable person in Barraza-Martinez's position the choice to submit to the additional questions. Barraza-Martinez's consent to the search of the vehicle was a product of the subsequent consensual exchange. Accordingly, the district court properly denied the defendants' motions to suppress.

The Third Circuit hears oral argument this week in a significant privacy case involving cell phone tracking data: Case offers rare glimpse into the mechanics of federal criminal investigations where nearly all documents are filed ex parte and stay under seal until indictments are handed up by Shannon P. Duffy in The Legal Intelligencer (February 8, 2010). As the article notes, this is the first federal appeals court to take on this issue:

In a case that could prove to be one of the most important privacy rights battles of the modern era, the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals will hear argument this week on the proper legal standard to apply when prosecutors demand cell phone location data.

The data, which are recorded about once every seven seconds whenever a cell phone is turned on, effectively track the whereabouts and the comings and goings of every cell phone user.

Justice Department lawyers argue that, by statute, they need only show "reasonable grounds" to believe that such records are "relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation."

But a federal magistrate judge in Pittsburgh strongly disagreed in February 2008, issuing a 52-page opinion that said the prosecutors must meet the "probable cause" standard.

Fourth Amendment does not apply to a shooting where the person shot by a Border Patrol officer fled into Mexico and died. He was never apprehended by officers. Rodriguez v. United States, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9177 (S.D. Cal. February 3, 2010):

Here, after being shot, Rodriguez ran across the border to Mexico. Once in Mexico, he was transported to a Red Cross Hospital in Tijuana, where he later died. Thus, there is no dispute that the Rodriguez was never apprehended or in the custody of Defendant Campos or any other U.S. law enforcement officer. Based on these undisputed facts, Defendant Campos did not search or seize Rodriguez, and the Fourth Amendment is not implicated. To rule otherwise would mean that the Fourth Amendment applies whenever someone is shot by federal law enforcement. But the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment covers "only 'searches and seizures'…." County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 140 L. Ed. 2d 1043 (1998). And the Supreme Court has also clarified that the amendment does not cover attempted seizures. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 n.2, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991). Because this case did not result in an actual seizure, Plaintiffs' contention that this Court committed clear error lacks merit.

Defendant’s stop was with reasonable suspicion from an unproved but identified and corroborated CI. Then a drug dog was called in, and the ten minute delay was reasonable. United States v. Smith, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9468 (D. Minn. February 4, 2010).*

Seizure of non-drug evidence under a search warrant for drugs depends upon its own apparent incriminating nature and it does not have to be related to the drug crime to be valid. Sostre v. County of Suffolk, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 2433 (2d Cir. February 5, 2010) (unpublished):

Here, Plaintiffs seem to believe that the fact that possession of chukka sticks is a crime is not enough to support either seizure or arrest because the incriminating character of chukka sticks in drug dealing was not immediately apparent. There is no requirement that the "incriminating character" relate to the objects of the warrant. The chukka sticks were in the closet, plainly covered by the search warrant. See U.S. v. Shi Yan Liu, 239 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that so long as the police act within the scope of the warrant, evidence will not be suppressed simply because it was not particularized in the warrant). It is well-established that "seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980). Because it is against New York state law to own or possess chukka sticks, there was also sufficient probable cause to support Sostre's arrest.

The law of the scope of immigration stops and inquiries was not clearly established, so the officers could not be held liable for a stop, questioning, and transport to another place for further questioning. Estrada v. Rhode Island, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 2390 (1st Cir. February 4, 2010).

By the time defendant sought to revoke his consent, the officer had probable cause to believe that his car had contraband secreted in it, and revocation came too late. Rockward v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 110, 2010 Ark. App. LEXIS 98 (February 3, 2010).

Officers entered defendant’s home on a federal arrest warrant which was valid under Payton, and a state search warrant. The smell of marijuana inside supported a wider search. While there was reason to question the validity of the state search warrant, it is obvious the police could have gotten a federal search warrant, too, and inevitable discovery supported the search. United States v. Jackson, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 2287 (5th Cir. February 3, 2010)*:

In this case, the officers did not seek a search warrant based on the evidence which could have been seized pursuant to the arrest warrant because they already had a state search warrant. But, had they had reason to question the validity of the state search warrant or had there been no state search warrant, we have little doubt that the officers nonetheless could have secured a search warrant and conducted the search that yielded the disputed evidence.

As to the second requirement for invoking the inevitable discovery doctrine, it almost goes without saying that the government was actively pursuing a substantial alternate line of investigation at the time of the alleged constitutional violation. Lamas, 930 F.2d at 1102. Indeed, we have indicated that the "active-pursuit element" may no longer be necessary to invoke the inevitable discovery rule. Id. at 1104. In this case, we need not address the continuing vitality of the active-pursuit element, as an ongoing grand jury investigation that has already led to an indictment would clearly satisfy it.