A Sheriff’s deputy stopped defendant’s boat for a safety check at 11 pm on an otherwise busy recreational lake. There was nothing remarkable about defendant’s operation of the boat to call attention to it. During the stop, the deputy determined defendant was under the influence. The stop was without reasonable suspicion and unreasonable. State v. Allen, 2013 Ark. 35, 2013 Ark. LEXIS 54 (February 7, 2013) (4-3):

At issue is a brief stop by a law-enforcement officer to assure that a vessel complies with applicable safety requirements. It is a stop at the order of a law-enforcement officer and constitutes a seizure that is certainly less intrusive than a traditional arrest; however, it is a seizure and means that the law-enforcement officer is “lawfully present” and under a duty to act where the law enforcement officer reasonably suspects a crime has been or is about to be committed. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 3.1 (2012). A seizure under the Fourth Amendment must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society’s legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular individual or that the seizure must be carried out under a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 51. Regardless of how brief or slight the intrusion, or how weighty the public interest, “an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field.” Id.

Sergeant Tucker testified that, while he tried to stop and perform a safety check on as many vessels as he could in a given day, there was no plan and nothing to determine which boats he stopped. There were no specific, objective facts about Allen’s vessel to indicate that society’s legitimate interests required the seizure of Allen and his particular vessel. As the circuit court found, Allen’s vessel was being legally operated in an unremarkable fashion. Sergeant Tucker testified that he did not believe that he had “the unfettered discretion to pull over any boat at any time for any reason that [he desired],” but only to perform a safety check. However, this means that whether the stop is proper depends only on the law enforcement officer’s subjective assertion of his or her purpose when the Fourth Amendment requires objective facts supporting the stop or a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations. As the circuit court found, the practice of safety-check stops by law-enforcement officers in this case violates the Fourth Amendment.

There was reasonable suspicion for defendant’s arrest after a stop on information from a CI. United States v. Stallings, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2551 (3d Cir. February 6, 2013):

The following factors are relevant to this inquiry:

(1) [whether] the information was provided to the police in a face-to-face interaction, allowing an officer to assess directly the informant's credibility;
(2) [whether] the informant can be held responsible if her allegations are untrue;
(3) [whether] the information would not be available to the ordinary observer;
(4) [whether] the informant has recently witnessed the criminal activity at issue; and
(5) [whether] the witness's information accurately predicts future activity.

Johnson, 592 F.3d at 449. However, "a tip need not bear all of the indicia-or even any particular indicium-to supply reasonable suspicion." United States v. Torres, 534 F.3d 207, 213 (3d Cir. 2008).

“Nevertheless, in cases involving arrests or warrantless searches or seizures, law enforcement officers are entitled to qualified immunity if they had even arguable probable cause. See Swint v. City of Wadley, Ala., 51 F.3d 988, 996 (11th Cir. 1995); Eubanks v. Gerwen, 40 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 1994). Arguable probable cause exists if ‘reasonable officers in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the Defendants could have believed that probable cause existed.’ Swint, 51 F.3d at 996 (quotation marks omitted).” “[W]e conclude that, given the facts as we must view them for purposes of summary judgment, the officers lacked even arguable probable cause or exigent circumstances justifying their entry into Feliciano's apartment without a warrant or her consent.” Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2013).

“In view of the overwhelming authority and limited information obtained during the officers' cursory investigation, reasonable officers would conclude that entering Nelms's apartment without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. Fleming and Whitt are not entitled to summary judgment on their defense of qualified immunity.” Nelms v. Wellington Way Apts., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2513, 2013 FED App. 0124N (6th Cir. February 4, 2013).

Probable cause for arrest grants qualified immunity to arresting officers. Abbott v. Oller, 497 Fed. Appx. 683 (8th Cir. 4, 2013).*

“‘[T]he existence of probable cause will defeat a claim of malicious prosecution and unreasonable search and seizure.’” Fahie v. Rivera, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2368 (2d Cir. February 4, 2013).*

Factual dispute on basis for arrest denies summary judgment. Pane v. Gramaglia, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2449 (2d Cir. January 30, 2013).*