Archives for: January 2013, 26

01/26/13

Permalink 11:38:41 pm, by fourth, 40 words, 1197 views   English (US)
Categories: General

Los Angeles Times: "Pregnant woman hogtied by officers gets $250,000 settlement"

Los Angeles Times: Pregnant woman hogtied by officers gets $250,000 settlement by Richard Winton:

Tamara Gaglione was pulled over for talking on her cellphone while driving on the freeway. A video captured her being hurled to the ground and tied up.

Permalink 03:00:00 pm, by fourth, 246 words, 1219 views   English (US)
Categories: General

On the Media: "Facebook's New Social Search"

On the Media: Facebook's New Social Search:

Facebook has introduced a new search tool called social graph search, which lets users search across the Facebook database by users' interests. Privacy advocates aren't pleased with the new feature, arguing that it makes information about users too easy to find. Bob talks to Tom Scott, who has been given early access to the feature and has been publicizing some of his searches.

Yet another diminution of privacy, merely using computer software to reveal what's already there.

Facebook is Exhibit A proving we have created a whole generation of people who have no respect for their own privacy. More importantly, what does that say about the future of the Fourth Amendment? That scares me.

As H.R. "Bob" Haldeman put it on the Nixon White House tapes, "Once the toothpaste is out of the tube, it is hard to put it back in." Once you put something on the Facebook or the Internet, you can't take it back. Even if you delete it, there are websites that can recreate pages at a particular time, and, worse yet, Facebook can provide it by subpoena.

Now, if Facebook would only require a search warrant like Google and Yahoo!. Regretfully, I suspect Mr. Zuckerberg's mentality on this is informed only by his own desire to acquire more information which he knows modern Americans will stupidly give up. We all know it. What does this portend for privacy advocates in the next decade?

Permalink 02:00:34 pm, by fourth, 110 words, 990 views   English (US)
Categories: General

WaPo: Antoine Jones trial starts in DC

WaPo: Accused drug dealer, representing himself, hears prosecutors open their case by Matt Zapotosky. Antoine Jones, the citizen accused in United States v. Jones, started his trial this last week, representing himself:

As prosecutors laid out the case against him, Antoine Jones took copious notes, loudly tearing sheets of paper from a notebook as he filled each page.

Jones, a former nightclub owner and suspected high-level cocaine dealer, is representing himself in what is his third trial on a drug conspiracy charge. If Friday’s brief proceedings in the District’s federal court were any indication, the next several weeks of arguments and testimony will provide several more memorable moments.

Permalink 02:00:00 pm, by fourth, 154 words, 974 views   English (US)
Categories: General

NYTimes Editorial: "When Police Violate the Constitution"

NYTimes Editorial: When Police Violate the Constitution:

The federal courts are bearing down on the New York City Police Department’s constitutionally suspect stop-and-frisk program, under which hundreds of thousands of citizens are stopped on the streets each year, often illegally and for no discernible reason. Earlier this month, the federal judge who is presiding over three lawsuits that challenge different parts of the program issued her harshest ruling yet, putting the city on notice that some aspects of stop and frisk are clearly unconstitutional.

The ruling, by Judge Shira Scheindlin of Federal District Court in Manhattan, came in the case of Ligon v. the City of New York. The case was brought on behalf of people who say they were illegally stopped, given tickets or arrested on trespassing charges in private apartment buildings, some of them in buildings where they lived.

The judge excoriated the city for flagrant indifference to the Fourth Amendment. ...

Permalink 12:49:53 pm, by fourth, 692 words, 1410 views   English (US)
Categories: General

CA4: Plaintiff stated First Amendment retaliation claim for being arrested for having Fourth Amendment written on chest

Plaintiff took off his shirt at airport security, and the text of the Fourth Amendment was written on his chest. Wearing only shorts and socks, he cooperated with the screening process, and he was arrested and handcuffed for disorderly conduct. He stated a claim for First Amendment retaliation against the TSA officers and local police who arrested him. Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2013):

The facts:

In anticipation that he might be subjected to enhanced screening, Mr. Tobey had written the text of the Fourth Amendment on his chest as he believed AIT scanning was unconstitutional. Before proceeding through the AIT unit, Mr. Tobey calmly placed his sweatpants and t-shirt on the conveyor belt, leaving him in running shorts and socks, revealing the text of the Fourth Amendment written on his chest. Agent Smith advised Mr. Tobey he need not remove his clothes. Mr. Tobey calmly responded that he wished to express his view that TSA’s enhanced screening procedures were unconstitutional.

At this point, Agent Smith radioed for assistance. As commanded by her supervisor, Appellant-Agent Jones, Agent Smith ordered Mr. Tobey to remain in front of the AIT unit. Agent Jones and unknown Appellant-Agent Doe then asked RIC police for assistance. At no point did Mr. Tobey refuse to undergo the enhanced screening procedures. Nor did he decline to do anything requested of him. In fact, Mr. Tobey alleges that he "remained quiet, composed, polite, cooperative and complied with the requests of agents and officers."

RIC police officers Vann and Mason arrived on the scene and immediately handcuffed and arrested Mr. Tobey. None of the TSA agents informed RIC police of what occurred at the screening station, nor did RIC police ask. Officer Vann escorted Mr. Tobey to a side area and informed him he was under arrest for creating a public disturbance. Agent Doe searched Mr. Tobey’s belongings, removing unidentified items. Officer Mason then collected Mr. Tobey’s belongings with assistance from Agents Smith and Doe.

Mr. Tobey was then taken to the RIC police station where Officer Vann and other officers questioned Mr. Tobey and threatened him with various criminal sanctions. Mr. Tobey was eventually charged with disorderly conduct in a public place. See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-415. The officers later released Mr. Tobey after consulting with an Air Marshal from the Federal Air Marshal’s Joint Terrorism Task Force. In total, Mr. Tobey was held for over an hour. Mr. Tobey boarded the plane without further incident. The Commonwealth Attorney for Henrico County subsequently dropped the disorderly conduct charge.

He survives qualified immunity analysis:

These legal conclusions are well supported by the facts laid out in Mr. Tobey’s complaint. Mr. Tobey alleges that he removed his sweatpants and t-shirt to reveal the text of the Fourth Amendment on his chest. Appellants told him that he did not have to remove his clothing, but he responded that he wished to express his views that the screening process was unconstitutional. Immediately after this assertion, Appellants engaged RIC police officers to arrest him.

They handcuffed and seized him with no questioning and without telling him why he was being arrested. In short, Mr. Tobey’s complaint satisfies all three elements of a First Amendment claim as he alleges: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected non-violent protest; (2) he was seized as a result of the protest; and (3) the temporal proximity of his peaceful protest and his arrest, unsupported by probable cause, shows Appellants engaged in impermissible retaliation. Cf. Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001) (observing that "the timing of the search raises an inference of retaliatory motive"). The factual allegations in the complaint, viewed as a whole, have "facial plausibility" that "allow[] the court to draw reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This is not a case where the complaint is merely "threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements supported by mere conclusory statements." Id. These factual allegations, when viewed as accurate, adequately support Mr. Tobey’s legal assertion that he was unlawfully seized in retaliation for exercising his protected First Amendment rights.

Permalink 03:00:03 am, by fourth, 341 words, 595 views   English (US)
Categories: General

PA: State completely failed to justify a protective weapons search of car

Defendant was stopped driving a car with allegedly overtinted windows, and he lowered the windows when asked to talk to the officer and presented his license. There were no articulable facts given at all to support a Long protective sweep of the vehicle for weapons because defendant did or said nothing to suggest he was a danger or armed. Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 2013 PA Super 12, 63 A.3d 294 (2013):

In contrast to the Commonwealth's recitation of the facts, our review of the record in this case reveals that it is significantly lacking in articulable facts that would allow us to reverse the suppression court's decision. The entirety of Officer Johncola's testimony comprises little more than six pages of transcript, with the direct examination conducted by the Commonwealth covering just over three pages. The suppression hearing transcript contains no information about Officer Johncola's level of training or experience in conducting traffic stops (or even years of service) and is devoid of any testimony that Officer Johncola believed, based on his training and experience, that Cartagena possessed a weapon or had access to a weapon in his vehicle. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31; Long, 463 U.S. at 1049-50; see also In re O.J., 958 A.2d at 563 (officer testifying that police "normally" conduct a protective weapons search of a vehicle where they observe furtive hand movements during a stop, as "that behavior creates a fear that a weapon may be located where the movements occurred."). There was also no testimony describing the neighborhood in which this stop occurred, i.e., there is no testimony that it was a high-crime area; only that police stopped Cartagena in the 100 block of Lehigh Avenue in Philadelphia. ... Furthermore, there is no indication that Cartagena did not immediately stop for the police ...; that the police saw any weapons in the vehicle prior to conducting a the protective search (see Long, 463 U.S. at 1051; ...); or that he made any movements that caused Officer Johncola to believe that Cartagena was in possession of a weapon or that Cartagena posed a safety threat ....

Permalink 02:44:58 am, by fourth, 197 words, 482 views   English (US)
Categories: General

MA: Civil court order satisfied warrant requirement; entry also on exigency

A constable had a court order he was serving to have defendant tenant’s gas turned off because others in the apartment building could smell the gas, and it was feared dangerous. When the constable came to the apartment with a gas technician to deal with it, defendant at the door acted like he had a gun in hand, and a gun was seen behind him. His actions accentuated the sense of emergency, and the constable and gas company representative lawfully entered defendant’s house to neutralize the gas issue under exigent circumstances. The civil court order satisfied the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and state constitution. The officers had to call for an experienced firearms tech to neutralize all the guns. In the course of that he found a bomb. Commonwealth v. Cantelli, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 156, 982 N.E.2d 52 (2013).

During defendant’s recorded police interview played for the jury, it came out that he refused consent of his cell phone. Agreeing that refusal of consent shouldn’t come before the jury, this was an isolated reference and the court isn’t convinced it was prejudicial. State v. Pellegrini, 2013 Ohio 141, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 116 (3d Dist. January 22, 2013).*

Permalink 02:00:08 am, by fourth, 314 words, 793 views   English (US)
Categories: General

PA sheriffs can't statutorily establish sobriety checkpoints on own

Pennsylvania sheriffs do not have the statutory authority to establish sobriety checkpoints on their own because their authority to arrest doesn’t include suspicionless stops. Commonwealth v. Marconi, 64 A.3d 1036 (Pa. 2013), revg 2010 PA Super 83, 996 A. 2d 1070 (2010) (concur here; dissent here):

In terms of such independent authority, we conclude essentially where we began. Again, suspicionless stops are not made based on an in-presence breach of the peace or commission of a felony; rather, they are inherently investigatory. Cf. Commonwealth v. Dobbins, 2005 PA Super 274, 880 A.2d 690, 696 (Pa. Super. 2005) (Del Sole, P.J., dissenting) ("In this case, the sheriffs were conducting an investigation, thus looking for a breach of the peace, not witnessing one."). Since Leet, majority decisions of this Court have repeatedly confined sheriffs' non-statutory arrest powers to those for in-presence breaches of the peace or felonies. See Dobbins, 594 Pa. at 87-89, 934 A.2d at 1180-81; Kopko, 586 Pa. at 183, 892 A.2d at 774. Accordingly, the Leet rationale -- which defines sheriffs' common-law arrest powers for present purposes -- in no way authorizes the independent establishment and conduct of suspicionless roadside checkpoints by sheriffs or sheriffs' deputies. As amply related by the common pleas and intermediate courts, suspicionless stops represent a peculiar -- and highly regulated -- exercise of police powers, which are particularly broad in matters pertaining to highway safety. See Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 247, 470 A.2d 1339, 1340-41 (1983).

The members of this Court maintain great respect and express gratitude for sheriffs and their deputies in the performance of indispensable public services within their realm. We reiterate, however, that they are not police officers -- nor are they invested with general police powers beyond the authority to arrest for in-presence breaches of the peace and felonies -- in the absence of express legislative designation.

We hold that the Sheriffs did not have the authority to independently establish and conduct the suspicionless sobriety checkpoint at which Appellee was arrested.

Permalink 12:59:43 am, by fourth, 380 words, 562 views   English (US)
Categories: General

MN: Illegal arrest, Mirandizing, being nice doesn't purge the taint of arrest

Defendant confessed after an illegal arrest. Miranda warnings and not being treated confrontationally during the illegal arrest by the police did not purge the taint. Suppressing here serves the purposes of the exclusionary rule. Not suppressing evidence on these facts would reward illegal police and likely cause future violations. State v. McDonald-Richards, 2012 Minn. LEXIS 724 (January 23, 2012):

The district court improperly admitted McDonald-Richards' statement because the court did not consider the statement's admissibility "in light of the policies served by the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule." Weekes I, 312 Minn. at 7, 250 N.W.2d at 594. One of the purposes the exclusionary rule serves is to deter police violations of the Fourth Amendment. Brown, 422 U.S. at 599. There is no dispute in this case that McDonald-Richards' Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the police seized her without probable cause. Indeed, police witnesses at the pre-trial suppression hearing conceded that they had no information regarding McDonald-Richards' participation in the robbery and murder at Avi's and considered her merely a person of interest when they arrested her. Based on the information known to the arresting officers at the time of McDonald-Richards' arrest, there was no objective basis for a reasonable officer to conclude there was probable cause for her arrest. See State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999) (noting that probable cause is measured objectively). When police arrest someone without probable cause and fail to articulate any other lawful basis for their conduct, the police violation of the Fourth Amendment is flagrant. See Weekes II, 268 N.W.2d at 710 (noting that "[t]he most important factor in the determination that the confession was illegally obtained was the flagrant nature of the police action."); see also Weekes I, 312 Minn. at 7, 250 N.W.2d at 594 (noting that police action is considered flagrant when it is "clear that [the] defendant was taken into custody and confined without a warrant and without probable cause" because "absent probable cause there is not and never has been any lawful basis for holding a person for investigation or on suspicion.") (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such unlawful seizures will not be deterred if, as the district court held, the giving of a Miranda warning, two hours of confinement, and a non-confrontational police interrogation are sufficient to purge the taint from the constitutional violation.

Permalink 12:00:40 am, by fourth, 171 words, 552 views   English (US)
Categories: General

Wired.com: "Yahoo, Like Google, Demands Warrants for User E-Mail"

Wired.com: Yahoo, Like Google, Demands Warrants for User E-Mail by David Kravets:

Yahoo demands probable-cause, court-issued warrants to divulge the content of messages inside its popular consumer e-mail brands — Yahoo and Ymail, the web giant said Friday.

The Sunnyvale, California-based internet concern’s exclusive comments came two days after Google revealed to Wired that it demands probable-cause warrants to turn over consumer content stored in its popular Gmail and cloud-storage Google Drive services — despite the Electronic Communications Privacy Act not always requiring warrants.

“Yes, we require a probable cause warrant for e-mail content,” said Yahoo spokeswoman Lauren Armstrong, in an e-mail interview. “That is more than ECPA requires.”

The nation’s other major consumer-facing e-mail provider — Microsoft — which markets the Hotmail and Outlook brands, declined comment for this story.

In short, Yahoo and Google are granting their customers more privacy than the four corners of the ECPA. There’s been a string of conflicting court opinions on whether warrants are required for data stored on third-party servers longer than 180 days.

Permalink 12:00:13 am, by fourth, 180 words, 583 views   English (US)
Categories: General

OH3: Defendant not in custody when he consented to DNA sample

Defendant was not yet in custody when he was Mirandized and lawyered up. Then the officer asked for and got consent for a DNA sample. “Frazier knew he was not under arrest and was free to leave at any time. We also cannot find any sign that law enforcement's actions were so coercive that Frazier's will was overborn.” Defendant wasn’t in custody so that did not violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. State v. Frazier, 2013 Ohio 142, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 115 (3d Dist. January 22, 2013).*

Defendant was stopped for an expired LPN in a high crime area. When the officer approached the driver, the officer could see a digital scale in the pocket on the back of the front seat. Defendant was asked to get out of the car, and he refused. He was physically removed. He was asked it he was armed, and he wouldn’t say. He was handcuffed. The smell of marijuana was coming from the car, and he voluntarily consented to a search of the car. United States v. Smalls, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9681 (D. S.C. January 24, 2013).*

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by John Wesley Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer and
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Little Rock, Arkansas
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2009 to date:

2013-14 Term:
  Riley v. California, granted Jan.17, argued Apr. 29 (ScotusBlog)
  United States v. Wurie, granted Jan.17, argued Apr. 29 (ScotusBlog)
  Plumhoff v. Rickard, granted Nov. 15, argued Mar. 4 (ScotusBlog)
  Stanton v. Sims, 134 S.Ct. 3, 187 L. Ed. 2d 341 (Nov. 4, 2013) (per curiam)
  Navarette v. California, granted Oct.1, argued Jan. 21 (ScotusBlog)
  Fernandez v. California, 134 S.Ct. 1126, 188 L. Ed. 2d 25 (Feb. 25) (ScotusBlog)

2012-13 Term:
  Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 186 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013) (ScotusBlog)
  Missouri v. McNeeley, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (ScotusBlog)
  Bailey v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1031, 185 L.Ed.2d 19 (2013) (ScotusBlog)
  Florida v. Harris, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 185 L.Ed.2d 61 (2013) (ScotusBlog)
  Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013) (ScotusBlog)
  Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 185 L.Ed.2d 264 (2013) (ScotusBlog)

2011-12 Term:
  Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S.Ct. 987, 181 L.Ed.2d 966 (2012) (other blog)
  Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S.Ct. 1510, 182 L.Ed.2d 566 (2012) (ScotusBlog)
  United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012) (ScotusBlog)
  Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S.Ct. 1235, 182 L.Ed.2d 47 (2012) (ScotusBlog)

2010-11 Term:
  Kentucky v. King, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) (ScotusBlog)
  Camreta v. Greene, 131 S.Ct. 2020, 179 L.Ed.2d 1118 (2011) (ScotusBlog)
  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (ScotusBlog)
  Davis v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) (ScotusBlog)

2009-10 Term:

  Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 130 S.Ct. 546, 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009) (per curiam) (ScotusBlog)
  City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 177 L.Ed.2d 216 (2010) (ScotusBlog)

2008-09 Term:
  Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009) (ScotusBlog)
  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (ScotusBlog)
  Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009) (ScotusBlog)
  Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) (ScotusBlog)
  Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 129 S.Ct. 2633, 174 L.Ed.2d 354 (2009) (ScotusBlog)


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"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't."
—Me

"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud

"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).

"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence."
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).

Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment.
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).

"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today."
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property."
Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)

"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment."
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)

"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable."
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)

"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)

“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)

“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)

"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards

"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]

“You know, most men would get discouraged by now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
Pepé Le Pew

"There is never enough time, unless you are serving it."
Malcolm Forbes

"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)


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