Looking at news stories last night, I had some questions about the mechanics of firearm surrender under NYS’s Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement Act signed into law yesterday. I found that New York law already is replete with provisions for surrender of firearms or licenses on the occurrence of particular events. The Act uses "surrender" 42 times. The first, for example:

§ 2-a. Firearm, rifle or shotgun surrender order. Upon entry of a verdict of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect, or upon the acceptance of a plea of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect, or upon a finding that the defendant is an incapacitated person pursuant to article seven hundred thirty of this chapter, the court shall revoke the defendant's firearm license, if any, inquire of the defendant as to the existence and location of any firearm, rifle or shotgun owned or possessed by such defendant and direct the surrender of such firearm, rifle or shotgun pursuant to subparagraph (f) of paragraph one of subdivision a of section 265.20 and subdivision six of section 400.05 of the penal law.

There are several others, such as for conviction of a crime, or believed to be mentally impaired, with a psychotherapist reporting privilege, all protected by judicial review.

What if the owner of a firearm refuses to give it up when ordered to by a court? A search warrant issues. People v. Degiorgio, 36 A.D.3d 1007, 827 N.Y.S.2d 342, 343 (3d Dept. 2007). Because it is a compelled act of production, however, it can't be used against the gun owner under the Fifth Amendment. People v. Havrish, 8 N.Y.3d 389, 834 N.Y.S.2d 681, 866 N.E.2d 1009 (2007). As for a search warrant, it could be viewed as an administrative warrant, but it is still issued by a judicial officer and subject to review for sufficiency.

GSR test doesn’t need a separate warrant if it is done incident to arrest. United States v. Williams, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5943 (N.D. Va. January 15, 2013) (adopting R&R):

Although the defendant feels that [United States v. Simmons, 380 Fed. Appx. 323 (4th Cir. 2010),] only provided qualified approval regarding conducting a GSR search without a warrant incident to arrest, this Court believes that the only qualification the Fourth Circuit indicated was the requirement that it be conducted pursuant to a lawful arrest. As indicated, this Court finds that such arrest was in fact lawful, as the officers had probable cause to make the arrest and, therefore, the magistrate judge's report and recommendation concerning the motion to suppress evidence is affirmed and adopted.

... The Fourth Circuit stated in Simmons, "the GSR test, a 'very limited search,' was appropriate as a search incident to arrest" after it found that Simmons did not contest the lawfulness of the arrest. 380 F. App'x at 330; see United States v. Allen, 358 F. App'x 697, 699 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation concerning a GSR test conducted without a warrant as "the delicate nature of the gunshot residue required law enforcement to administer the test quickly before the evidence could be wiped off or destroyed"); see United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 793, 795-96 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation concerning a GSR test so long as the arrest was valid, as the "presence of gun powder on his hands was relevant" and the defendant "could have eventually removed or destroyed" the evidence).

Officers forcibly arrested defendant and took him to the DEA office to obtain his consent, which is found invalid, as was his statement. “And as noted above, the evidence suggests the agents' unlawful actions, including the forcible manner of arrest and transporting defendant to the DEA, had an investigatory purpose and were designed to surprise or confuse defendant and thereby obtain information from him, rather than to secure his voluntary cooperation.” Ultimately, however, a search warrant was obtained free of the taint of the consent and statement, and that warrant is not suppressed, but the rest is. United States v. Lindgren, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4912 (D. Kan. January 11, 2013).

GPS on defendant’s car before Jones was valid under Davis. Alternatively, the government had a ping tracking warrant for his cell phone which is not contested. United States v. Orbegoso, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5881 (D. Ariz. January 15, 2013).*

The search warrant for defendants’ motel room was based on probable cause. Part of that was from a plain view of the contents of their car parked outside, which is not challenged. United States v. Medina, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184369 (D. Minn. October 31, 2012) (R&R).*

When a family member calls 911 about an overdose and emergency responders know that the person they called about is a heroin user, the responders have exigent circumstances to enter. Here, the occupants rebuffed the police saying an RN in the house checked him out, but they could see he was still in need of treatment. Under prior case law, that did not dissipate the exigency. The responders could also check for the source of the overdose and do a protective sweep. Stricker v. Twp. of Cambridge, 710 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 2013):

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