A trial court issued an injunction against a strip club requiring searches of employees' bags coming to work and video recording those searches as well as any public area of the club. The court held that the club lacked standing to complain of the searches and recording that it was being ordered to conduct invasions of privacy by injunction and make the recordings available to the government. Nabilco Inc. v. State, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 157 (Tex. App. – Houston (14th Dist.) January 10, 2013) (memorandum opinion):

The provisions at issue in this appeal require appellants to thoroughly check all bags of independent contractors and employees each time they enter appellants' premises and videotape those checks, enforce a dress code for all patrons on the premises requiring shirts to be tucked in, enforce a dress code for dancers to cover their buttocks, and use existing video cameras to record activity at all times that the premises are open.

Appellants argue that bag checks and video cameras, with tapes submitted to the State, violate the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. This contention fails because the rights invoked by Treasures belong to the individual employees, contractors, and patrons — not to Treasures. "HN15Fourth Amendment Rights are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34, 99 S.Ct. 421, 428, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978); see also United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 2010) ("Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights, which may be enforced only by the person whose rights were infringed."). A party lacks standing to complain about the invasion of someone else's personal rights. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Therefore, appellants have no standing to assert a Fourth Amendment claim on behalf of Treasures' dancers and customers. See Club Retro, LLC v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 195 n. 5 (5th Cir. 2009) (club owner had no standing to assert Fourth Amendment rights on behalf of its patrons).

In Skinner, the railroad companies had to conduct the searches of employees by federal regulation. That didn't bother SCOTUS.

Oregon explains consent after illegal police conduct and purging the taint. State v. Hemenway, 353 Ore. 129, 295 P.3d 617 (2013):

Properly considered, then, a voluntary consent to search that is prompted by an officer's request can be sufficient to purge the taint of illegal police conduct. Whether the voluntary consent is sufficient to purge the taint — or whether the police exploited their illegal conduct to obtain consent — will depend on the totality of the circumstances. We reject the state's position that voluntary consent during an unlawful stop necessarily breaks the causal chain and makes the evidence admissible, as we do defendant's argument that such consent will rarely, if ever, break the causal chain.

In an effort to clarify this complicated area of law, we again review the basic principles at issue. As noted, the overarching inquiry is whether the evidence that the state seeks to introduce must be suppressed because that evidence was obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. In the context of Hall and this case, where an illegal stop preceded a consent to search, that inquiry has two prongs. First, the court must assess whether the consent was voluntary. If the consent to search was not voluntary, then the evidence must be suppressed, because only a voluntary consent to search provides an exception in this context to the warrant requirement of Article I, section 9. Second, even if the consent was voluntary, the court must address whether the police exploited their prior illegal conduct to obtain the evidence. Evidence may be tainted directly by the illegal police conduct, if, for example, the police illegally stop a vehicle, allowing them to view contraband that otherwise would not have been visible, and then request the driver's consent to search the vehicle as a result of what they saw. The consent in that example does not "purge the taint" of the prior illegal stop, because the evidence has a direct causal connection to the illegal conduct.

Defendant stopped and talked to a couple that police saw pacing on a parking lot. Police stopped him, and he was nervous. It was not reasonable suspicion that a drug deal was going to go down. Commonwealth v. Walton, 2013 PA Super 3, 63 A.3d 253 (2013).*

The stop was not overlong and unreasonable because reasonable suspicion developed. [The court uses unfortunate language that suggests the burden is on defendant: “Campbell has not provided sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the duration of the stop was excessive.” The burden is on the government, and the appellate review is de novo. What is his burden on appeal? To show legal error.] United States v. Campbell, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 696, 2013 FED App. 0049N (6th Cir. January 9, 2013).*

The conversation after defendant’s papers were returned to him was consensual, and there was nothing that indicated that the conversation couldn’t be terminated. United States v. Chung Dam, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184139 (M.D. Fla. November 16, 2012).*

Defendant’s house was searched under a state search warrant starting at 9:05 pm. Officers came back and searched again early the next morning. In these circumstances, the second search was a continuation of the first. United States v. Pape, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184063 (D. Minn. December 10, 2012):

The Eighth Circuit, citing the Sixth Circuit, has previously explained that "entries onto premises on successive days pursuant to a single warrant" are not necessarily illegal when "[t]he authority of the warrant ha[s] not expired and ... the return search [is] not beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment." See United States v. Carter, 854 F.2d 1102, 1107 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Bowling, 351 F.2d 236, 241 (6th Cir. 1965), ...). In Carter, the police had executed a search of the defendant's hotel room pursuant to a valid search warrant obtained based on information police had gathered from an earlier, consented entry into the hotel room. 854 F.2d at 1104-1105. After one of the officers presented the defendant with an inventory list of the items seized from the hotel room, the defendant informed the officer that "$4,000 hidden under the mattress had been omitted." Id. at 1105. The police then returned to the hotel and seized the cash. Id. In rejecting the defendant's challenge to the "return search," the court explained that "the question [was] not whether there were two entries pursuant to the warrant, but rather, whether the second search was a continuation of the first," and found the search proper because "the warrant listed money as an item to be recovered and the search took place several hours later." Id. at 1107 (citing United States v. Huslage, 480 F. Supp. 870, 875 (W.D. Pa. 1979)).

In Bowling, upon which the Eighth Circuit relied in Carter, the police had executed a search warrant at approximately 6:15 p.m. on April 2, 1963, as part of which they recorded serial numbers for numerous items but seized only one. 351 F.2d at 240. After having cross-referencing the serial numbers acquired from the defendant's residence with police lists of stolen equipment, the officers returned the next morning with a truck and seized and removed other machines from the defendant's basement. Id. In rejecting the defendant's argument that the search was improper, the court explained that "certainly the mere fact that the time of [the search warrant's] first use was promptly noted thereon did not vitiate its powers as of the following morning." Id. at 241.

Similarly, in Huslage, upon which the Eighth Circuit also relied in Carter, the police conducted an initial search of the defendant's vehicle at approximately 4:10 a.m. on July 9, 1979, during which they did not seize any evidence. Huslage, 480 F. Supp. at 874. Although the warrant, by its terms, had to be served by 5:00 a.m., at approximately 10:00 a.m. that morning, after the victim of the crime the defendant was charged with provided that she had seen the pistol in the defendant's vehicle, the police conducted a second search of the vehicle. Id. "Aided by natural light," the police found the pistol they were seeking in the vehicle. Id. In rejecting the defendant's argument that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights, even though the Court found that the warrant according to its terms had expired, the court held that

the fact that the police made two entries into the [vehicle] pursuant to a single search warrant does not require a finding that the police violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the defendants. The question is not whether the police went through the door of the vehicle twice, but rather, whether the search conducted at 10:00 A.M. was a continuation of the search that had been initiated at 4:10 A.M.

Id. at 875 (citing Bowling, 351 F.2d at 241). It emphasized that the second search was made within nine hours of when the search warrant was issued and within twelve hours after the police had arrested the defendants and "[t]he probable cause supporting the search had not become stale." Id.

Power Down: Tasers, The Fourth Amendment, and Police Accountability in the Fourth Circuit by Ian A. Mance, 91 N.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013):

This Comment focuses its attention on the phenomenon of taser abuse in the states that comprise the Fourth Circuit: Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. It assesses the state of the law as presented to genuine victims of police abuse who wish to vindicate their right to be free of excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal statute under which plaintiffs can seek relief for violations of their constitutional rights by state actors.