A tennis ball in defendant’s pocket found during a patdown could be removed because the officer couldn’t tell what it was. When it was removed, a plastic bag could be seen though a cut in it. This is different than Dickerson. State v. Taylor, 401 S.C. 104, 736 S.E.2d 663 (2013).

Defendant was a police officer living in a rental house owned by his parents, and he had a computer in the commonly used basement. His mother had access to it and turned it on finding child pornography, which she reported. She had common authority to consent to a search of the basement. Extra hard drives in a box were in plain view, and the officers’ knowledge gave them reason to believe the incriminating nature was immediately apparent. The hard drives could be seized for a later search with a warrant. State v. Reinpold, 284 Neb. 950, 824 N.W.2d 713 (January 4, 2013).

The officer had reasonable suspicion for a continued stop based on excessive nervousness and inability to say where she had come from or was going. United States v. Fajardo-Guevara, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 683 (5th Cir. January 10, 2013).*

Defendant’s wife and daughter sparingly used the family computer, but that didn’t mean that the wife didn’t have actual authority to consent to a search of it. She found child pornography on the computer and called the police and consented to a search of the computer. It was password protected, but the password wasn't working at the time in question. United States v. Marandola, 489 Fed. Appx. 522 (2d Cir. 2013)*:

While Lisa Marandola admitted to using the Apple computer sparingly, she still had access to it, as did her daughter. The computer was located in a common area and was purchased using joint funds. Mrs. Marandola paid for internet out of her own personal account. Moreover, Mrs. Marandola testified that her husband never told her that she was prohibited from using the computer, and that password protection was not enabled on the day in question. These facts provide compelling evidence that Lisa Marandola had common authority over the area, a substantial interest in the area, and even tacit permission to gain access to the area.

The evidence in the record supports consent to search. Three witnesses testified that defendant did, and other evidence pointed to wasn’t conclusive of anything. United States v. Perry, 703 F.3d 906 (6th Cir. 2013).*

Democracy Now: Bronx Residents Accosted by NYPD Win Landmark Court Ruling Deeming "Stop and Frisk" Tactic Illegal:

A federal judge has ruled that New York City police are not allowed to routinely stop pedestrians outside of private residential buildings in the Bronx. The stops are part of the so-called Clean Halls program, which has prompted allegations of police harassment by some residents who say they are being accosted outside of the buildings in which they live. Previous data on the New York Police Department’s "stop-and-frisk" policy has shown African-American and Latino men make up a hugely disproportionate share of those stopped. We’re joined by Molly Kovel, staff attorney with the Bronx Defenders and part of the legal team in the case, and by Abdullah Turner, a Bronx resident whose building is enrolled in the Clean Halls program and who says he was unfairly arrested while waiting for a friend inside. [includes rush transcript]

Police were called to a domestic disturbance and arrested the defendant in possession of a backpack. Even though he was handcuffed, he was not secured in the back seat of a police car, and a search incident of the backpack was reasonable because of the violent nature of the arrest. State v. Ellison, 172 Wn. App. 710, 291 P.3d 921 (2013):

=> Read more!

A child pornography investigator’s use of the “Wyoming Tool Kit” that searches for and finds child porn on a computer connected peer-to-peer by locating hash (SHA) values of known child porn images does not violate some other expectation of privacy. State v. Dunham, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 1743 (La.App. 1 Cir. December 21, 2012):

The issues presented in the defendant's brief were recently addressed by the Third Circuit in a factually similar case, State v. Daigle, 2011-1209 (La. App. 3d Cir. 5/2/12), 93 So.3d 657. In Daigle, Louisiana State Police detectives conducted an investigation using the Wyoming Tool Kit and discovered the defendant's IP address was seen with SHA values consistent with child pornography. At trial, the detectives explained that the Wyoming Tool Kit was designed by the Wyoming Department of Justice and ran on the Gnutella network. According to the detectives, software such as LimeWire and BearShare also ran on the Gnutella network. The Wyoming Tool Kit identified IP addresses that had SHA values matching images previously identified as child pornography. Daigle, 93 So.3d at 659-60. The detectives used GNU Watch in addition to the Wyoming Tool Kit, and testified that both programs only ran on the Gnutella network. Id. at 663. Citing several recent federal court decisions, the court found that in applying for a search warrant, the detective did not violate any reasonable expectation of privacy on defendant's part by using software available only to law enforcement to identify defendant's IP address as having SHA values that might be associated with images of child pornography. It explained:

Federal courts have examined the issues presented in Defendant's appeal and have determined that defendants have no Fourth Amendment privacy rights in computer files that they have shared on file sharing networks such as Gnutella regardless of whether the defendants have logged onto the Gnutella network through clients such as Lime[W]ire, Morpheus, BearShare, or Shareaza. .... This is equally true if the investigating law enforcement officer uses software specially modified to screen for child pornography, such as ShareazaLE or the Wyoming Tool Kit, provided that the software has no greater access to the defendants' computer files than that available to any other Gnutella client. Gabel, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107131, 2010 WL 3927697; United States v. Borowy, 595 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2010) [per curiam], ...

Daigle, 93 So.3d at 665.

We agree with third circuit's reasoning and find that Tpr. Sandifer did not violate the defendant's right to privacy by using GNU Watch to examine the SHA values for files the defendant had already elected to freely share with other LimeWire users. Moreover, the defendant offered no evidence at trial in support of his assertion that publicly available programs are unable to obtain the SHA values of files on LimeWire, and the record does not support that argument. Therefore, the defendant's arguments related to the alleged violation of his right of privacy are without merit.