While statute requires a blood draw from a “qualified technician,” there is no statutory exclusionary remedy for a failure. Alternatively, this blood draw was not otherwise unreasonable to justify exclusion. State v. Coxwell, 2012 Ohio 6215, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 5428 (11th Dist. December 31, 2012).*
The suppression motion wasn’t timely, and the state was offered a continuance to prepare, which it declined. It can’t claim prejudice merely from the untimely motion that was granted. There was a violation of state statute in the taking of urine for a BAC, but the statute does not provide for suppression as a remedy. Under state law, if the statutory violation equates with a constitutional violation, suppression would be a valid remedy. Here there was also consent. The trial court found that the defendant consented, but there was no finding on voluntariness of consent. The judgment is reversed and remanded for a new suppression hearing where the trial court will make findings on voluntariness. State v. Starkey, 2012 Ohio 6219, 985 N.E.2d 295 (11th Dist. 2012).*
Defendant’s detention was held in a prior appeal in 2010 to be valid, so it couldn’t be relitigated. The affidavit for the search warrant was not deceptively false under Franks. The statement was a reasonable conclusion based on the evidence available to the officer, which is permitted. State v. Mendenhall, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1 (January 2, 2013).* [Not yet on court's website]
On cross, the officer admitted the inventory search was a search for evidence. (“Q. And in your concern, your focus in searching that vehicle was, in large part, to find items that police could use in their investigation, true? A. That was correct.”) After the court suppressed the search, the government moved for reconsideration and this time offered the inventory search policy, which it failed to put into evidence the first time. The court didn’t like it, but considered it anyway, and still suppressed the search. If relying on inventory, the government has a duty to support it with the policy. Even on reconsideration, the motion to suppress is not set aside because government did not show the search was a true inventory. What and how it was seized was important here, and the search of the car was treated like an evidentiary search. United States v. Caskey, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1167 (D. Minn. January 3, 2013):
6 The United States seems to argue that it was not required at the evidentiary hearing to define the inventory search policy or demonstrate Officer Bobo's compliance with it. Instead, the United States argues, the limited issue before the Court and raised by Caskey was whether Officer Bobo had an "investigatory purpose" or motive in conducting the search. The Court disagrees. When Caskey argued there was an improper purpose for the search, the United States had the burden to produce evidence that the search was instead conducted pursuant to established inventory search procedures or pursuant to another exemption from the warrant requirement. See Kennedy, 427 F.3d at 1144 ("As with any warrantless search, the Government bears the burden of demonstrating the need for an exemption from the warrant requirement and that its conduct fell within the bounds of the exception."). The United States could not meet its burden through a bald assertion that Officer Bobo complied with a largely undefined policy and thus did not have an improper purpose. Officer Bobo testified that his concern when searching the vehicle was in large part to find items that the police could use in their investigation, and he admitted that he gathered items of value only to the police. As will be further explained below, under these circumstances, the United States had the burden to prove that the gathering of evidence was conducted pursuant to a valid inventory search and not due to an investigatory purpose.
. . .
7 Normally, an investigatory motive alone does not sour an inventory search. Rowland, 341 F.3d at 780. The Court notes, however, that the NBPD inventory search policy states that "examination of the contents of a motor vehicle pursuant to a criminal investigation or with the intent of discovering evidence of a crime is a search, not an administrative inventory" and is thus subject to an entirely separate policy. (United States Ex. 1 at 1, Aug. 15, 2012, Docket No. 77; see also id. at 3.) It is thus possible that Officer Bobo's admission of an at least partially investigative intent might cause his search to fall outside of the NBPD inventory search policy. (See Tr. 20:4-15.) For the purposes of this Order, however, the Court will assume without deciding that the evidence of Officer Bobo's investigatory motive does not render the inventory search policy inapplicable.
. . .
The Court finds that the United States has not shown that Officer Bobo's search fell under either the inventory search or plain view exceptions to the warrant requirement. First, the United States has not established that the requirements of the plain view exception are satisfied in the present case. Officer Bobo seized the majority, if not all, of the items from the vehicle because of their criminal nature, thus relying on the plain view exception and the inventory search policy's requirement that items of evidentiary value be seized. Officer Bobo did not testify with specificity, however, how he was able to view each of the items he seized. See Beasley, 688 F.3d at 530. For example, the United States did not demonstrate that the Taco Bell cups and straws were in plain view because Officer Bobo provided no testimony about them.
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"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't."
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays
down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its
application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect
results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at
bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping
government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having
and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that
the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and
safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing
can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence."
—Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment.
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
—Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
—United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
—Pepé Le Pew
"There is never enough time, unless you are serving it."
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
—Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)