Defendant’s claim he didn’t flee–he merely walked away to a porch and sat down. That was flight enough for reasonable suspicion. United States v. Colbert, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182322 (N.D. Ill. December 27, 2012):
Defendant nevertheless argues that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion because Defendant did not "flee" from the police but simply ran onto a porch and sat down. (Def.'s Mot. Quash & Suppress 6.) But Defendant began running away from the officers when the man on the corner appeared to have alerted Defendant of their presence. Running upon noticing the police is highly evasive behavior. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 at 124 ("Headlong flight — wherever it occurs — is the consummate act of evasion"). Furthermore, courts regularly find evasive behavior short of the type at issue here sufficient to warrant a Terry stop. See, e.g., Oglesby, 597 F.3d at 894 (finding defendant's actions in slowly taking a few steps away from a group while looking from side to side and angling his body away from the police officers were pertinent factors in determining reasonable suspicion); U.S. v. Harris, 188 Fed. Appx. 498, 501-02 (7th Cir. 2006) ("We have held that walking away quickly in the face of commands by police officers to stop is evasive behavior that contributes to the reasonableness of an officer's suspicion."); U.S. v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop and concluding that "[i]t was also reasonable for [the officer] to interpret the [defendant's] vehicle's sudden acceleration as evidence of unprovoked flight"); U.S. v. Mays, 643 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2011) ("flight is not the only type of 'nervous evasive behavior.' Furtive movements made in response to a police presence may also properly contribute to an officer's suspicions.") (internal citations omitted); U.S. v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 660 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that courts can consider "evasive conduct that falls short of headlong flight" and holding that defendant's "evasive conduct" included "immediately walk[ing] away as the officers approached, and although [defendant] did not run, he walked away at a quick pace, ignoring the officer's commands to stop.") Thus, Defendant's actions, coupled with the circumstances already described, provided the officers with reasonable suspicion to stop and investigate him pursuant to Terry. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25; U.S. v. Lenoir, 318 F.3d at 729.
"I'm gonna check the car real quick and get you on your way, alright?" is not a search by consent. State v. Ross, 2012 Ohio 6111, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 5274 (9th Dist. December 26, 2012):
[*P19] As soon as Officer Perez completed his pat down search, he indicated that he wanted to search Ross' car. Specifically, he stated, "I'm gonna check the car real quick and get you on your way, alright?" Ross repeatedly stated during the exchange that he did not understand why it was necessary for Officer Perez to search the car. Each time, Officer Perez indicated that the search was something that needed to be done and simply ended his statements with "alright?" Officer Perez also told Ross: (1) "well, it's not even really your car," (2) there was concern due to the fact that Ross had just left a high crime area, and (3) after Ross had just left a motel, "people leaving the motel, this is kind of what we do." When Ross finally assented to the search, he stated in the same sentence "but there's no need for this." Officer Perez never clarified Ross' statement. Instead, he stated that the search would only take a few minutes and proceeded to search the car.
Consent was found purely on a question of credibility of the witnesses. Since defendant admitting lying twice to the officer about his identity, it wasn’t error for the trial court to believe the officer. State v. Jones, 2012 Ohio 6150, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 5313 (9th Dist. December 28, 2012).*
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by John Wesley Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer
Little Rock, Arkansas
Contact / About
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www.LawofCriminalDefense.com
@JohnWesleyHall
Online since Feb. 24, 2003
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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2013-14 Term:
Fernandez v. California, granted May 20 (ScotusBlog)
2012-13 Term: 2010-11 Term: General (many free): Congressional Research Service: "If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." "A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays
down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its
application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect
results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at
bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping
government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having
and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that
the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and
safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." "The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing
can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment. "There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today." "The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property." "It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment." "The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." "A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable." "For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." “Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” “Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” "You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." "In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up." “You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
"There is never enough time, unless you are serving it."
Maryland v. King, granted Nov. 9, argued Feb. 26
(ScotusBlog)
Missouri
v. McNeeley, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (Apr. 17) (ScotusBlog)
Bailey
v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 185 L. Ed. 2d 19 (Feb. 19) (ScotusBlog)
Florida
v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61 (Feb.
19) (ScotusBlog)
Florida
v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (Mar. 26) (ScotusBlog)
2011-12 Term:
Ryburn
v. Huff, 132 S.Ct. 987, 181 L.Ed.2d 966 (Jan. 23,
2012) (other
blog)
Florence
v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S.Ct. 1510, 182 L.Ed.2d 566 (April 2,
2012) (ScotusBlog)
United
States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (Jan. 23, 2012) (ScotusBlog)
Messerschmidt
v. Millender, 132 S.Ct. 1235, 182 L.Ed.2d 47 (Feb. 22, 2012) (ScotusBlog)
Kentucky
v. King, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (May 16, 2011) (ScotusBlog)
Camreta
v. Greene, 131 S.Ct. 2020, 179 L.Ed.2d 1118 (May 26, 2011) (ScotusBlog)
Ashcroft
v. al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (May 31, 2011) (ScotusBlog)
Davis
v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (June 16, 2011) (ScotusBlog)
2009-10 Term:
Michigan
v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 130 S.Ct. 546, 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (Dec. 7, 2009) (per
curiam) (ScotusBlog)
City
of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 177 L.Ed.2d 216 (June 17, 2010) (ScotusBlog)
2008-09 Term:
Herring
v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (Jan. 13,
2009) (ScotusBlog)
Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (Jan. 21, 2009)
(ScotusBlog)
Arizona
v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (Jan. 26, 2009)
(ScotusBlog)
Arizona
v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (April 21, 2009)
(ScotusBlog)
Safford
Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 129 S.Ct. 2633, 174
L.Ed.2d 354 (June 25, 2009) (ScotusBlog)
Research Links:
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F.R.Crim.P.
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www.fd.org
FBI
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DEA
Agents Manual (2002) (download)
DOJ
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Electronic
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Overview
of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (2012)
Outline
of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping (2012)
Federal
Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping (2012)
Federal
Laws Relating to Cybersecurity: Discussion of Proposed Revisions (2012)
ACLU on privacy
Privacy
Foundation
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Information Center
Criminal
Appeal (post-conviction) (9th Cir.)
Section 1983 Blog
—Me
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
—Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
—Pepé Le Pew
—Malcolm Forbes
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)