NYT Editorial: Sneaky Apps That Track Cellphones:

A perversion of smartphone technology called “stalking apps” — precise, secretive trackings of the movements of cellphone users — is increasingly a matter of national concern, particularly for domestic abuse victims. No less threatening is the routine monitoring of children’s locales and phone habits for commercial purposes while parents are kept in the dark. Stealth apps even stoop to cyber-leering through the now notorious app called Girls Around Me, which allows men to search out women, unbeknown to them, by cross-matching GPS technology with information and photo sites like Facebook.

With these abuses proliferating, the Senate Judiciary Committee this month took a big step to protect the privacy of all cellphone users and close legal loopholes that enable stalking apps. The committee approved a worthy measure sponsored by Senator Al Franken, Democrat of Minnesota, that for the first time would require cellphone companies to obtain a user’s permission to collect location data and sell it or share it with third parties. It also would flatly outlaw creation of stalking apps, applying criminal and civil penalties.

The Sixth Circuit is troubled by three weeks of constant video surveillance of defendant’s backyard by a pole camera in light of Jones and its trespass holdings. “We are inclined to agree with the Fifth Circuit that ‘[t]his type of surveillance provokes an immediate negative visceral reaction.’” Nevertheless, the court finds the error, possible error harmless and doesn’t have to decide it. United States v. Anderson-Bagshaw, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26220, 2012 FED App. 1297N (6th Cir. December 19, 2012):

Since the "backyard" was visible from a publicly accessible location, the government agents were constitutionally permitted to view whatever portions of it were visible from this point. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."). The government agents never physically invaded the "backyard." They merely observed it from a point where they had a right to be. See United States v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 1269, 1281 (10th Cir. 2000), judgment vacated on other grounds by Jackson v. United States, 531 U.S. 1033 (2000) (holding that using pole cameras to view outdoor areas surrounding a home and easily observable by people passing by does not violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Jenkins, 124 F.3d 768, 773-74 (6th Cir. 1997) (recognizing the difference between physical invasion of curtilage and "visual inspection from a lawful vantage point").

Nonetheless, we confess some misgivings about a rule that would allow the government to conduct long-term video surveillance of a person's backyard without a warrant. Few people, it seems, would expect that the government can constantly film their backyard for over three weeks using a secret camera that can pan and zoom and stream a live image to government agents. We are inclined to agree with the Fifth Circuit that "[t]his type of surveillance provokes an immediate negative visceral reaction." United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating in dicta that using a pole camera to view curtilage over a 10-foot fence constitutes a Fourth Amendment search). We also note that Ciraolo involved a brief flyover, not an extended period of constant and covert surveillance.

Furthermore, it appears that at least five Justices of the Supreme Court share our concerns about certain types of long-term warrantless surveillance. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring and Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). But Jones involved GPS tracking, and it may be that the privacy concerns implicated by a fixed point of surveillance are not so great as those implicated by GPS tracking. The camera revealed only Bagshaw's activities outside in her yard—a fixed space which was open to public view. It did not "generate[] a precise record of [her] public movements that reflect[ed] a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations" like a GPS device would do. See id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Ultimately, since we hold that any possible Fourth Amendment violation here would be harmless, we decline to decide whether long-term video surveillance of curtilage requires a warrant.

A woman lawyer was the target of a home invasion and aggravated attempted rape in 1994 in Nashville. She struggled with the assailant who beat her head, and she bit off a piece of skin on his finger, spitting it under the bed. He left. In 2000, a DNA profile was run on the piece of the finger, and the DHA description was included in a John Doe warrant as a specific identifier. In 2006, the grand jury indicted John Doe. In 2008, a likely fingerprint match was made off the piece of the finger with defendant who had applied for a job at the DOC. Once police had a likely candidate for a suspect, a match on a palm print was made and the police then sought a DNA sample, and that matched the defendant. He was charged, tried, and convicted. A John Doe warrant with a DNA description was sufficiently particular under the Fourth Amendment, and the statute of limitations was properly tolled. State v. Burdick, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 903 (December 18, 2012), aff’g State v. Burdick, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 886 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 2, 2011):

Several jurisdictions have addressed the issue since [Wisconsin] in Dabney [State v. Dabney, 2003 WI App 108, 264 Wis. 2d 843, 663 N.W.2d 366 (2003)], and most have concluded that inclusion or reference to a unique DNA profile in a "John Doe" arrest warrant or indictment sufficiently describes a person to satisfy statutory requirements. In State v. Danley, the Ohio Court of Common Pleas cited Dabney with approval and held that an affidavit of complaint and arrest warrant against "John Doe," which identified the suspect by gender and a DNA profile, was sufficient to commence the criminal action, thereby tolling the statute of limitations. 2006 Ohio 3585, 853 N.E.2d 1224, 1226-28 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2006). More recently, in People v. Robinson, the California Supreme Court ruled that an arrest warrant that described the suspect only as "John Doe, unknown male" with a unique 13-loci DNA profile adequately identified the defendant under both the Fourth Amendment and California's statutory scheme, thus timely commencing the prosecution. 47 Cal. 4th 1104, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 727, 224 P.3d 55, 75-76 (Cal. 2010). Finally, in Dixon, the Massachusetts Supreme Court observed that a DNA profile is more than a description; "it is, metaphorically, an indelible 'bar code' that labels an individual's identity with nearly irrefutable precision." 938 N.E.2d at 885 (citing NRC at 2, 7, 9). Consequently, that court held that a "John Doe" indictment incorporating the suspect's unique DNA profile and additional physical description "unassailably fulfil[led] the constitutional requirement that an indictment provide 'words of description which have particular reference to the person whom the Commonwealth seeks to convict,'" sufficiently identified the defendant, and tolled the statute of limitations. Id. at 885-86.

. . .

We are persuaded that a DNA profile exclusively identifies an accused with nearly irrefutable precision and, as a general rule, satisfies the particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. In our view, the "John Doe" designation in the warrant at issue, coupled with the detailed DNA profile of the assailant, identified the Defendant with "reasonable certainty," as is required by both constitution and statute. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7; Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-208; Tenn. R. Crim. P. 4(c)(1)(B). As a result, the prosecution was properly and timely commenced within the eight-year statute of limitations by the filing of the "John Doe" arrest warrant on February 2, 2000.

. . .

IV. Conclusion

A criminal prosecution is commenced if, within the statute of limitations for a particular offense, a warrant is issued identifying the defendant by gender and his or her unique DNA profile. Furthermore, a superseding indictment in the defendant's proper name provides the requisite notice of the charge. The judgment of conviction is, therefore, affirmed.

Officers conducted a protective sweep and saw ammunition in plain view. They also had enough to seek a search warrant, and they did, including the reference to the ammunition. There was a misleading paragraph in the affidavit. Excising it and the reference to the ammunition, there was still probable cause for issuance of the search warrant, and the motion to suppress is denied. United States v. Torres, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179774 (E.D. Pa. December 19, 2012).*

Defendant’s 2255 claim that his criminal defense lawyer failed to object to the search of the car he was in was vague and conclusory. From the court’s own review of the record, defendant likely lacked standing to challenge the search of the car which was with probable cause based on the testimony at trial. Therefore, the lawyer couldn’t be ineffective. United States v. McIntyre, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179957 (D. Kan. December 17, 2012).*

Defense counsel fully argued the Fourth Amendment in the District Court and then appealed it to the Fifth Circuit, so there he is barred from relitigating it by collateral estoppel. Castille v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180871 (W.D. Tex. December 20, 2012).

The search of defendant’s car was justified by the automobile exception with probable cause or the search incident doctrine although the car was moved before the search to the police station. Defendant was stopped on a street, and a crowd had begun to form. It was within the officers’ discretion to move the car for the search for officer safety. United States v. Thompson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179981 (E.D. Pa. December 20, 2012).

Defendant was stopped for not wearing a seatbelt, and the officer took his DL back to the patrol car for a computer check which took eight minutes. By then backup arrived, and the officer got out and asked about drugs. That additional questioning was supported by furtive movements in the car and defendant’s brother being a known gang member. On review by the District Court, the stop was broken down into five parts, and each supported the next and overall was reasonable. United States v. Marin-Sanchez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180226 (E.D. Wis. December 20, 2012), R&R 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180224 (E.D. Wis. November 27, 2012).*