Defendant failed to show that omission of disputed facts from the affidavit for the search warrant constituted a Franks violation. What was there showed probable cause, and including what was omitted wouldn’t have changed anything. United States v. Miller, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174509 (N.D. Ohio December 10, 2012):

While "false information" can include material omissions, the Sixth Circuit has "repeatedly held that there is a higher bar for obtaining a Franks hearing on the basis of an allegedly material omission as opposed to an allegedly false affirmative statement." United States v. Fowler, 535 F.3d 408, 415 (6th Cir. 2008) ("Allegations of material omission are held to a higher standard because of the 'potential for endless rounds of Franks hearings' due to potentially 'endless conjecture about investigative leads, fragments of information, or other matter[s] that might, if included, have rebounded to defendant's benefit.'" (quoting United States v. Martin, 920 F.2d 393, 398 (6th Cir. 1990)). The Sixth Circuit has reiterated that "except in the very rare case where the defendant makes a strong preliminary showing that the affiant with an intention to mislead excluded critical information from the affidavit, and that omission is critical to the finding of probable cause, Franks is inapplicable to the omission of disputed facts." Mays v. City of Dayton, 134 F.3d 809, 816 (6th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original). Thus, "an affidavit which omits potentially exculpatory information is less likely to present a question of impermissible official conduct than one which affirmatively includes false information." United States v. Atkin, 107 F.3d 1213, 1217 (6th Cir. 1997).

P.S.: Defendant's street name in the indictment is "Jesus Penis."

Defendant called 911 because of a small propane tank exploding, severing the tip of his finger and cutting him. The 911 dispatcher did not limit the size of the tank, and firefighters responded. Through a window they could see blood and heard the sound of running water. Defendant had cuts on his chest, too, and he explained the explosion. While the explosion was not great, based on all the firefighters knew, an entry was justified, and marijuana plants and pipe bombs were in plain view. United States v. Infante, 701 F.3d 386 (1st Cir. 2012):

Based on these facts, the firefighters had a reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, both to believe that there was an emergency and to associate the emergency with the inside of Infante's residence. Infante's reports of an explosion involving volatile gas, whether propane or butane, coupled with his significant wounds that were consistent with the occurrence of an explosion, caused the firefighters to reasonably perceive an emergency -- the prospect of a secondary explosion resulting from escaping gas. Under these circumstances, the danger of a secondary explosion is akin to that of a rekindling fire that the Supreme Court identified in Tyler as a continuing danger that justified fire officials' remaining in a building for a reasonable time after extinguishing a fire in order to promptly investigate its cause. See Tyler, 436 U.S. at 510; see also Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293 (1984) ("Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not apply in such cases."). Indeed, relying in part on the Court's reasoning in Tyler, a number of our circuits have held that the presence of potentially explosive chemicals can justify warrantless entry into a home. ...

Defendant was the subject of a child pornography knock-and-talk, and he consented to the government seizing his computers to look for child porn which he admitted was on his computers. He asked to copy files he needed for school work, and they let him. The next day, his attorney wrote the FBI and revoked his consent to the search and seizure of the computers, and 25 days later, the FBI submitted a search warrant request to a USMJ who sat on it for another six days because he was in a habeas hearing. On the totality, the 25 days was not an unreasonable seizure. This was a small FBI office, and their delay was not unreasonable considering defendant was given access to the files he needed, and he didn’t ask for me. While his possessory interest was interfered with, it wasn’t unreasonably interfered with. United States v. Laist, 702 F.3d 608 (11th Cir. 2012):

Since there is no "per se rule of unreasonableness," McArthur, 531 U.S. at 331, the devil, as always, is in the details. The essential question boils down to this: whether the 25-day delay in this case was unreasonable. We hold that it was not. Initially, there is no doubt that Laist retained a significant possessory interest in his computer and his hard drives. See Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1351. The interference with Laist's possessory interest was not insubstantial, inasmuch as the FBI held his computer and hard drives for 25 days without his consent.

However, Laist's possessory interest in the contents of these possessions was diminished for several reasons. First, the district court found that Laist was afforded the opportunity to remove "whatever he wanted to download" from the computer and hard drives, and, notably, Laist did in fact remove files he needed for school. As the district court put it, "It is my understanding from the evidence that there was no limitation about this ... . [I]t [i]s clear from the record that if he wanted to take other things off at the time he also could have done that." Since the possessory interest in a computer derives from its highly personal contents, the fact that Laist had a real opportunity to copy or remove personal documents reduces the significance of his interest. Indeed, although Laist revoked consent on March 12, 2009, he did not request any additional files prior to the time the FBI obtained the search warrant on April 13, 2009, and there is no indication in this record that the FBI would have denied a request to retrieve additional non-contraband material on the computer. In the second place, Laist not only admitted to the presence of illicit images on the computer, which standing alone already diminishes his possessory interest, see Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1351, he actually showed an image of child pornography to the FBI agents during the course of the interview. This fact both diminishes Laist's interest further while also enhancing the government's legitimate interest in maintaining custody of the computer and hard drives as substantial evidence of a serious federal crime.

Nevertheless, since Laist retained a possessory interest, albeit a diminished one in his computer, the Fourth Amendment still obligated the United States to "diligently obtain[] a warrant." McArthur, 531 U.S. at 334. On this record, we are convinced the government acted diligently, and thus reasonably, based on several critical facts. ...