Defendant’s claim that the AUSA’s signature on warrant papers is constitutionally meaningless even if it was true. Similarly, the fact the affidavit was signed on one day before one judge and the warrant issued on another day before another judge does mean anything. The information about a robbery in this case wasn’t stale; just because the robber could have disposed of the proceeds doesn’t mean that he would. It was within a really short time after the robbery. United States v. Burroughs, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169066 (D. D.C. November 29, 2012).*

Probable cause existed for defendant’s arrest, and it was more than mere propinquity (Ybarra). He was known to have driven the co-defendant to a drug deal, and the CI said that more than one person would be coming. The DEA also had prior information about defendant dealing heroin. United States v. Nunez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169893 (W.D. N.Y. February 9, 2012).*

Nervousness and four cell phones, two of which were prepaid, and conflicting travel plans between the passenger and driver was reasonable suspicion to detain for 13 minutes for a drug dog to arrive which was also reasonable. United States v. Vaughan, 700 F.3d 705 (4th Cir. 2012).*

A motorcycle checkpoint program in New York State was shown to be justified by special needs. Wagner v. Sprague, 489 Fed. Appx. 500 (2d Cir. 2012) [but this is a memorandum opinion with no facts].

The government justified a protective sweep of defendant’s house by showing his history of violence. This one took less than two minutes. United States v. Davis, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169262 (S.D. W.Va. November 29, 2012)*:

The officers' check of the rooms was prudent, cursory, and over and done with in about two minutes. Given the Defendant's past history of violence, his evasive behavior upon the officers' arrival at the home, and the presence of a fully loaded assault weapon fitted with a large, unsheathed bayonet that was within easy reach of a potential hidden attacker, the officers had every reason to be concerned for their safety. In light of these facts, the officers' limited precautionary check of the spaces immediately adjoining the point of arrest was constitutionally reasonable.

The automobile exception applies to vehicles, not their occupants, and the state confesses error based on United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 586-87 (1948). State v. Freeman, 253 Ore. App. 472, 290 P.3d 908 (2012).

Defendant was seized by being ordered by loudspeaker to come out of the house, but there was probable cause to believe that he was involved in crime because the house was a murder scene, police knew an unidentified man was in there, and he wasn’t answering the telephone when they called the house. State v. Hudson, 253 Ore. App. 327, 290 P.3d 868 (2012).*

Defendant was lawfully stopped for blocking the street, and the officer could order defendant out of the vehicle, and that revealed a gun in plain view. State v. Kinard, 105 So. 3d 974 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2012).*

The state violated the Maryland Stored Communications Act, similar to the federal Stored Communications Act, in obtaining cell phone provider created information about his account by a state subpoena served out of state. He has no reasonable expectation of privacy in that information, so the evidence is not excluded. While the state did not explicitly raise standing in the trial court, the trial court found a lack of standing. Defendant’s argument that he did not have an opportunity to provide standing fails because he wouldn’t have standing as a matter of law, and this is harmless error if error at all. Upshur v. State, 208 Md. App. 383, 56 A.3d 620 (2012).

Defendant was stopped because he was suspected of being a hack taxi and threatening his passenger. He denied everything. In a patdown, the car keys in his pocket were subject to “plain feel” connecting him to the hack taxi. McCracken v. State, 429 Md. 507, 56 A.3d 242 (2012).*

Franks “reckless disregard” was shown in a wiretapping case. Here, the issue was the government’s claim they could not use additional GPS devices in exhausting other investigative techniques, and then actually did after that. United States v. Hamilton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169290 (W.D. Wash. November 16, 2012). Examples of Franks reckless disregard from the Ninth Circuit used to aid the analysis:

In Stanert, the Ninth Circuit held that an affiant acted with reckless disregard for the truth when he stated that a suspect had been arrested without mentioning that the suspect was not convicted, and stated that he investigated a lab blowup at the suspect's residence a year before without mentioning the suspect had purchased and moved into the residence after the explosion. 762 F.2d at 782. Similarly, in U.S. v. Chesher, the Ninth Circuit held that the affiant acted with reckless disregard for the truth by representing that a suspect was a current member of the Hell's Angels when affiant had been conducting an investigation for some time which would have apprised him that was untrue. 678 F.2d 1353, 1361 (9th Cir. 1982). In U.S. v. Davis, the Ninth Circuit held that an affiant acted with reckless disregard for the truth when he signed an affidavit written in the first person knowing that it would mislead the magistrate judge into believing he had first-hand knowledge of the facts therein. 714 F.2d 896, 899-901 (9th Cir. 1983). By contrast, in U.S. v. Dozier, the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court's finding that an affiant acted with negligence, rather than reckless disregard for the truth, was "not clearly erroneous." 844 F.2d 701, 705 (9th Cir. 1988). In that case, the affiant misrepresented the defendant's prior criminal history because he did not know how to read the rap sheets. He also falsely stated that another agent had told him that he had seen two vehicles on the defendant's property registered to drug suspects, when in fact, the affiant had conducted a registration check and knew this was not true. See id. at 705-06.

Surveillance of comings and goings to defendant’s apartment with a pole camera does not constitute a “trespass” under Jones. United States v. Brooks, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168738 (D. Ariz. November 28, 2012):

Additionally, as argued by the Government, despite a block wall that could potentially act as an enclosure or barrier that could obstruct the view of a person standing on the outside of the Westgate complex, the typical focal point of the pole camera was visible to any passerby inside the complex or to any person in the arena parking lot. In fact, Detective Kinsey testified that the complex's outer wall also had iron openings that allowed for easy visibility of Building "L" for someone standing outside of the complex. Defendant presented no evidence to rebut Detective Kinsey's testimony that he could simply walk into the complex from the street, leaving Defendant's assertions about the apartment community's keypad access as insufficient to show that there were special features or activities associated with the Westgate complex parking lot to support a reasonable expectation of privacy in the parking lot.

The evidence points to the fact that a person would not be required to be a complex resident to see the "comings and goings" at the Glendale Apartment, and any expectation of privacy by Defendant in the complex parking lot in front of Building "L" from surveillance was unreasonable. Therefore, law enforcement's use of the pole camera did not violate the Fourth Amendment and, thus, there was no need for law enforcement to seek a warrant before using the camera.

Defendant had been Mirandized and told he could refuse consent, so his consent is found voluntary. United States v. Brooks, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168734 (D. Ariz. November 28, 2012).*