Claimant admitted smoking marijuana two hours before his traffic stop as an explanation for the smell of marijuana in the car. He admitting having cash, but when it was found there was more than he admitted and it was packaged strangely. That was reasonable suspicion of use of the money for drug acquisition for seizure for forfeiture. United States v. Nineteen Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Five ($19,855.00) Dollars in United States Currency, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164737 (M.D. Ala. November 19, 2012)*:

Though there is nothing criminal about carrying large sums of money, even in unconventional ways, the characteristics of the res and its packaging offer the best support for the reasonable belief that a substantial connection existed between the res and illegal activity. First, Claimant carried approximately twice the amount of cash he first told officers he was carrying; his bag contained almost $20,000 rather than the $8,000 to $10,000 he first indicated. Second, the money was divided into stacks, secured with rubber bands, and stashed inside a microwave popcorn box carried in his backpack. "A common sense reality of everyday life is that legitimate businesses do not transport large quantities of cash rubber-banded into bundles and stuffed into packages in a backpack." United States v. $242,484, 389 F.3d 1149, 1161 (11th Cir. 2004). The facts sufficiently and plausibly support a reasonable belief that the res was furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for illegal drugs, or that it was otherwise traceable to the illegal drug trade.

The officer had reasonable suspicion to continue the stop where defendant and his passenger were in a brand new rental car, neither was on the paperwork, and they didn’t know the name of the renter. State v. Jalloh, 2012 Ohio 5314, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 4636 (2d Dist. November 16, 2012).

Because digital camera can record videos, a digital camera is seizable under a search warrant for “video recording devices.” United States v. Carson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165041 (C.D. Ill. November 19, 2012),* R&R 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168149 (C.D. Ill. October 25, 2012).

Defendant’s consent to DUI test was valid where he signed two consent forms that said it was voluntary, and he was not in custody when he signed. State v. Doyle, 139 Conn. App. 367, 55 A.3d 805 (2012).*

The officer did not produce the inventory policy and testified vaguely to it. Since the defense did not ask for it, the court can’t say the inventory was unconstitutional. The inventory itself will not be micro-managed by the courts. “The inventory here, while not a model, was sufficient to meet the constitutional minimum.” Also, policy was to impound a vehicle if the driver had no valid DL and the owner was not present. Since neither the driver nor passenger mentioned a word about the owner, the officer wasn’t constitutionally obligated to inquire. People v. Walker, 2012 NY Slip Op 7851, 20 N.Y.3d 122, 957 N.Y.S.2d 272, 980 N.E.2d 937 (2012):

Neither defendant nor his girlfriend asked the trooper if the girlfriend could drive the car, or told him that she had a driver's license and the owner's permission to drive it. The trooper was not required, as a matter of constitutional law, to raise the question, or to initiate a phone call to the owner. To impose such a requirement on police in such situations would not only create an administrative burden, but would involve them in making (and the courts in reviewing) difficult decisions in borderline cases. If a person present claims to have the owner's permission to drive, must the police take her word for it? If the owner is called and does not answer immediately, must police wait for a call back? It is reasonable for the police to institute clear and easy-to-follow procedures that avoid such questions.

. . .

Defendant's argument focuses on several alleged deficiencies in the proof relating to the inventory search: the written policy that governed the search was never produced; the state trooper's description of the policy was very vague; and the descriptions of the returned property on the inventory form — "misc. items" and "paperwork" — would be of limited usefulness in the event the car's owner claimed that some of her property was missing. These criticisms are not without force. Certainly, it would be better for a prosecutor seeking to prove the existence of a written policy to put a copy of the policy into evidence. On the other hand, defense counsel could have demanded that the policy be produced to help her cross-examine the trooper. She did not do so.

When a car has been lawfully impounded, the reasonable expectation of the person who was driving it that its contents will remain private is significantly diminished. In such a case, the driver presumably expects the police to find whatever is in the car. Galak, Johnson and Gomez establish that this does not give the police carte blanche to conduct any search they want and call it an "inventory search." The police must follow a reasonable procedure, and must prepare a "meaningful inventory list" (Johnson, 1 NY3d at 256). But it would serve little purpose for courts to micro-manage the procedures used to search properly impounded cars. The United States Supreme Court implicitly recognized as much in Bertine, by upholding as constitutionally valid a search producing what a trial court had found to be a "somewhat slipshod" inventory (479 U.S. at 369; see id. at 383 [Brennan, J., dissenting] [describing the inventory's deficiencies]). The inventory here, while not a model, was sufficient to meet the constitutional minimum.

Compare State v. Williams, 382 S.W.3d 232 (Mo. App. 2012), posted 11/1 with a different view of inventory.