DART transit operators called central control that two men got on a train wearing bandanas over their faces. Customers were fearful of a robbery. A transit police officer swept the train finding them, and they had reasonable suspicion for a frisk when the defendants were found. The call was not treated as an anonymous call, and the choice of wearing a bandana over one’s face justified the officer’s actions. The district court was not clearly wrong. While defendant claimed it was cold, video of the stop and frisk showed officers in short sleeves. United States v. Roberson, 496 Fed. Appx. 390 (5th Cir. 2012):

Third, Roberson argues that his attire--that is, the bandana covering his face--was not a legitimate basis for reasonable suspicion. He does not cite any case law holding that attire is an inherently inappropriate factor for a reasonable suspicion calculus. Roberson's principal contention regarding his attire is that there are reasons other than robbery that he might have been wearing a bandana, namely that it was cold. During the suppression hearing, Roberson presented evidence that a cold front had developed in Dallas that evening, and that at the time he boarded the DART train, the temperature was possibly 40 degrees Fahrenheit with wind chill, and that the inside temperature of the train was roughly similar. On the other hand, the train conductor and Officer Ibarra testified that it was not that cold on the train and that the train had a heater. The Government also presented video evidence that while some officers were wearing jackets on the scene, others were wearing short sleeves. This conflicting evidence does not clearly support Roberson's portrayal of the events, and thus we defer to the district court's resolution of the facts, since the court was uniquely situated to determine the credibility and reliability of the testimony. The district court did not clearly err in finding that Roberson was wearing the bandana for reasons unrelated to the weather.

Officers saw bullet holes in a car next to defendant’s fenced backyard and shell casings. While two hours had passed and there were 20 officers in the area, the entry was justified because of the risk of a wounded person, not a gunman. United States v. Schmidt, 700 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2012):

At the time of the search, gunshots had recently been heard in the neighborhood. Bullet holes were in a car that was adjacent to the backyard, bullet holes were in the 1424/1426 duplex itself, and there was a trail of about nine spent casings on the ground nearby, including five right next to the 1424/1426 duplex and one in the yard. These circumstances, taken together, made it reasonable for an officer to believe, at the time of the search, that people in the backyard area may have recently been shot and in need of immediate aid.

Schmidt principally argues that by the time of the search, two hours had already passed since the shots were fired and over 20 officers had blanketed the block. But the prime exigency in this case was the potential for wounded victims, not necessarily the threat of further shooting. If a victim had been shot in the yard, as a reasonable officer could have suspected, that victim would not have become any less wounded after two hours had passed; to the contrary, he would need immediate aid. It would not have made sense for an officer to wait for a warrant when a shooting victim could have been dying in the yard, and the officer also did not need to know that someone had actually been shot in order to go into the yard. ...

Officers got a valid warrant for defendant’s car for evidence linked to a shooting. In the car they found a digital camera, and they looked at pictures. Then they got a warrant for the camera, opining that there might be evidence on the camera. There was no showing of any reason to believe evidence would be found on the camera. The good faith exception was also inapplicable. United States v. Alkhaldi, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158870 (E.D. Ark. September 18, 2012), adopted 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158874 (E.D. Ark. November 6, 2012):

In this instance, the LRPD detective's declaration in the affidavit that "[i]t is believed that this camera is now concealing possible evidence of a crime" could not have been made without his premature and undisclosed search of the camera. Without that initial unauthorized search of the camera, his truthful representation to the issuing judicial officer would have been consistent with his testimony at the suppression hearing, that being, he did not suspect that there would be evidence in the camera until he looked in it. Under the state of facts, as the detective knew them to be, his belief in the existence of probable cause was entirely unreasonable.

The motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the execution of the car warrant should be denied. See Document 25. The motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the execution of the camera warrant, though, should be granted. See Document 16. Alkhaldi's supplemental motion to suppress should be denied as moot. See Document 17.

[Disclaimer: My case. Government didn't object to R&R, which was adopted yesterday. JT Tuesday.]

Defendant was arrested on a fast food restaurant parking lot, and it was appropriate for the officers to tow and inventory the vehicle under Ninth Circuit precedent. Also, defendant’s sister was called about getting the car, but she wouldn’t come until the following day. United States v. Sequeira, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158636 (D. Ariz. September 28, 2012).*

Defendant’s consent was voluntary; defendant told the officers where the firearms were and provided the key to get in. United States v. Yonts, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158911 (E.D. Ky. November 6, 2012).*

The security sweep of defendant’s garage was proper. The officers properly looked behind things for persons, and there they found hidden marijuana. This was called a “second” sweep by one of the officers, but the court finds that it was a continuation of the initial sweep. United States v. Sinclair, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158445 (W.D. N.Y. November 2, 2012).*

Officers had information that child pornography had been received at defendant’s house via the Internet, so they did a knock-and-talk. Defendant was then attempting to delete files to the recycle bin, so the officers decided to take the computer without a warrant for safekeeping. While the files were not being permanently deleted from the computer, that wasn’t determinative. United States v. Ma, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158775 (D. Mont. November 6, 2012):

The court finds that the agents' decision to take the computer with them did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Whether or not Ma's actions could have permanently destroyed the evidence of child pornography is not the question here. Ma's actions, taken immediately after he was informed that the agents were looking for evidence of possession of child pornography, made it reasonable for the agents to believe he was attempting to destroy evidence, regardless of the language in which the files were captioned. Ma points to no authority stating that agents in the field are required to have a sophisticated understanding of computer technology or absolute certainty about whether Ma's actions were reversible. Furthermore, the court notes that once the computer was seized by law enforcement, nothing was done to access its files until the search warrant was issued. This action adds to the reasonableness of the agents' actions, a critical inquiry under the Fourth Amendment. See Kentucky v. King, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) ("The ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness'") (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).