Defendant was stopped in a high crime area with at least reasonable suspicion. The fact there were drugs involved and the stop was a high crime area justified a patdown. The officer also articulated a fear [not facts] that defendant could have procured a weapon from the other person in the car. State v. Bales, 2012 Ohio 4968, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 4349 (2d Dist. October 26, 2012):

[*P23] Additionally, it is well recognized that the need for a protective pat down becomes more urgent where drugs are involved. "The very nexus between drugs and guns can create a reasonable suspicion of danger to the officer." State v. Thompson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-050400, 2006 Ohio 4285, ¶11. Further, "[r]ecognizing the prevalence of weapons in places where illegal drugs are sold and used * * * an officer's fear of violence when investigating drug activity is a legitimate concern that will justify a pat-down search for weapons." State v. Oatis, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2005-03-074, 2005 Ohio 6038, ¶ 23, citing State v. Taylor, 82 Ohio App.3d 434, 612 N.E.2d 728 (2d Dist.1992).

[*P24] We find that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Officer Benge articulated a reasonable basis to believe that appellant may be armed and dangerous. The area in which the officers stopped appellant was known for its high rate of crime and specifically its high rate of drug crimes. Officer Benge testified that, based on her knowledge and experience as an officer, "weapons are synonymous with drugs. They go hand and hand." Moreover, Officer Benge testified that she was concerned appellant may have obtained a weapon from the female passenger while they were in the back of the cruiser unhandcuffed. These factors, taken together and viewed objectively through the eyes of the officer on the scene, warrant a reasonable belief that appellant could be armed. Thus, the totality of the circumstances supports the trial court's finding that Officer Benge's pat down of appellant was proper.

Note: This is virtually a per se rule the way this is written.

The seizure of plaintiffs’ daughter for medical procedures was completely reasonable and based on medical advice, which plaintiffs virtually admit. Therefore, the special needs exception applies, and the state CPS officials have qualified immunity. Mueller v. Auker, 694 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2012).*

While defendant in the house of another logically would have standing to challenge anything seized off his person, defendant did not show a connection to the premises to have standing to challenge seizure of marijuana from the house. United States v. Aldaya, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154172 (E.D. N.C. October 26, 2012).*

Defendant’s Fourth Amendment 2255 claim fails for lack of an IAC or actual innocence claim. Thus, it had to be raised in the original proceeding and was defaulted. Parks v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154149 (N.D. Ga. October 1, 2012).*

“Officer Ammons therefore did not violate Defendant's rights by requesting his name and date of birth.” Defendant didn’t have his DL on him, saying it was in his “crib.” The officer asked for it, but wouldn’t let defendant go in the house to get it alone for officer safety. Thus, he followed defendant into the house. That was an illegal entry. The consent argument fails, too, because there was no express or implied consent to enter. The court notes similar cases. Marijuana was smelled and a warrant obtained. United States v. Harvey, 901 F. Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. W.Va. 2012), adopted 902 F. Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. W.Va. 2012):

In the case at bar, Defendant was not under arrest and was not believed to have committed any crime. No one was injured or needed assistance in the residence. There was no arrestable "underlying offense" in this case as regards Defendant. The driver of the car was driving without a license and the officers smelled burnt marijuana in the car. The officers found a bong in the trunk. Defendant was a passenger in the car. There was no evidence Defendant had committed any crime. He was not connected to the bong or the marijuana smell. The police did not find any marijuana in the car and did not test the bong for residue or fingerprints. Whether Defendant provided a false name or Officer Ammons heard the name incorrectly, Defendant's offer that his ID was in his "crib" was an insufficient reason for a warrantless entry into his home.

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes on the totality of the facts of this case that the United States has failed to carry its burden of proving that exigent circumstances existed or that an emergency existed which justified the warrantless police entry into Defendant's home on the date in question.

Russia Today: Fourth Amendment freedom in focus of US Supreme Court today:

The US Supreme Court will hear today arguments against the 2008 amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), upon which the government could obtain extended rights to spy on its citizens.

The arguments will be presented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).

Though the amendments are pursuing national security issues and not targeted at US citizens, they are, as the ACLU claim, violating the Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable searches.

The case is Clapper v. Amnesty International USA. [The Executive Branch of government is closed because of the hurricane, but the judicial branch isn't.]

Odor of burning marijuana coming from a house is enough to justify a search warrant for the house for the marijuana, even in the face of a claim that only a small amount of marijuana would be found. United States v. Kilgore, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154148 (N.D. Ga. September 13, 2012):

Kilgore contends that the information provided by Rawlings and the odor of burnt marijuana did not establish probable cause to search his residence, asserting that "it only tends to indicate the recent presence of a small amount of marijuana." [Doc. 50 at 4-5]. Kilgore's arguments, however, ignore the fact that the basis for the warrant for which probable cause was established was possession under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(a), see (Gov. Ex. 1), and courts have routinely found probable cause existed to search a residence based on a marijuana odor detected by law enforcement officers, see United States v. Yarbrough, 272 F. App'x 438, 443 (6th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citations omitted) ("[A]n officer's detection of the smell of marijuana in a home may by itself establish probable cause," and "[w]hen the smell of marijuana is coupled with [a] [ ] tip of drug activity, probable cause exists for a search warrant."); United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted) ("There is no doubt that the agent's suspicions rose to the level of probable cause when, as the door stood open, he detected what he knew from his law enforcement experience to be the odor of marijuana.") ; United States v. Harwell, 426 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1196 (D. Kan. 2006) (citation omitted) ("The odor of burning marijuana emanating from the open front door of a single home would lead a reasonable officer to believe that marijuana was probably present in the residence."); see also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948); United States v. Noriega, 676 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Cephas, 254 F.3d 488, 495 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Kittrell, No. CR 10-2903-TUC-RCC (JCG), 2011 WL 2746252, at *9 (D. Ariz. May 20, 2011), adopted by 2011 WL 2784618, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 13, 2011) (citation omitted); United States v. Neth, No. 6:09-cr-210-Orl-19GJK, 2010 WL 1257695, at *7-8 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2010); Floyd v. United States, Civil Action No. 3:08cv133-MEF, 2010 WL 1052839, at *7 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 18, 2010), adopted by 2010 WL 1197707, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 23, 2010); United States v. Murat, No. 08-20479-CR, 2008 WL 4394788, at *13 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2008), adopted at *1; United States v. Correa, No. 1:07-cr-00011-MP-AK, 2008 WL 1804309, at *12 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2008). In short, the totality of the circumstances presented in the affidavit, when taking a "realistic and commonsense approach" and not viewing the affidavit in a "hypertechnical manner," established probable cause for the search warrant for Kilgore's residence for the crime of unlawful possession of marijuana. Miller, 24 F.3d at 1361 (citation omitted).