computerworld.com: Fighting unconstitutional stingray phone surveillance that tracks innocent people by Darlene Storm:

Let’s say you have your cell phone with you, even if you are not talking or texting, otherwise minding your own business, innocent of being suspected of any crime ... but hey your privacy can be invaded as if you have no Fourth Amendment rights at all. A portable device known as an IMSI catcher, also known by the generic term stingray, acts like a fake cell tower and tricks your mobile device into connecting to it even if you are not on a call. It is used for real time location tracking; some can pinpoint you within two meters as well as eavesdrop and capture the contents of your communications. There’s been a stink about them for a little more than a year, but three big privacy and civil liberty groups, the ACLU, EPIC and the EFF have all warned that the secretive devices threaten your rights and that the invasive technology is unconstitutional.

NJ.com: N.J. Supreme Court wrestles with privacy issues in cellphone, GPS case by Anthony Campisi:

Justices of the state Supreme Court wrestled Monday with drawing new privacy protections in a world where police can engage in the sophisticated tracking of suspects using the most ubiquitous of devices: the cellphone.

From NACDL:

NACDL's October 23 Program (this morning) at the National Press Club -- Entrusting the Fourth Amendment to the Dogs: Canine Evidence and the Constitution (Introductory Remarks, NACDL President Steven D. Benjamin; Ilya Shapiro, Senior Fellow in Constitutional Studies, Cato Institute; Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC); Professor of Information Privacy Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Danielle Spinelli, Partner and Supreme Court Litigator, WilmerHale; former clerk to The Hon. Stephen Breyer, U.S. Supreme Court, 2000-01; Jeffrey S. Weiner, Criminal Defense Lawyer and Dog Sniff Expert, Miami, Florida; Past President of NACDL (1991-92); David G. Savage (moderator), Supreme Court Reoprter for the Los Angeles Times and Chicago Tribune.) Video available here (see right rail for player).

Taking defendant from his car at gunpoint and handcuffing him on the ground was reasonable under the circumstances, and it did not rise to the level of an arrest. United States v. Salas-Garcia, 698 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2012):

By contrast, the officers in this case acted reasonably under the totality of circumstances. The "quantum of force" used to detain Salas-Garcia was reasonable under the circumstances. The officers in this case did not conduct a felony arrest of Salas-Garcia. As Agent Davis explained in his testimony, a felony stop is "a very heightened state of readiness" by the police, where the officers arrive in "several units with guns drawn, giving specific orders to an occupant of a vehicle to do certain things." Aplee. Supp. App. at 96. But in this case, the patrol officers were only given instructions "to stop the car." Id. As the district court noted, there is nothing in the record that suggests that the patrol officer who stopped Salas-Garcia "drew or displayed his weapon, forced Defendant to the ground, or employed restraints other than handcuffs." Aplt. App. at 16-17.

Given the limited amount of information that the Task Force agents and uniformed patrol officers had regarding Salas-Garcia, placing him in handcuffs was reasonable under the circumstances to ensure both officer and public safety. We have noted that ""[a]n officer in today's reality has an objective, reasonable basis to fear for his or her life every time a motorist is stopped.'" United States v. Albert, 579 F.3d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 2009) ...

Defendant’s dodging a DUI roadblock with an abrupt furtive movement was reasonable suspicion for a stop. Stinson v. State, 318 Ga. App. 351, 733 S.E.2d 390 (2012).*

Defendant’s father gave his name to the FBI as possibly radicalized in Yemen, and what the FBI learned about him through that investigation was an independent source for much of the investigation. A second search of defendant’s computer by the government was denied. That would be addressed in a classified opinion. United States v. Mohamud, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151430 (D. Ore. October 22, 2012).*

“ Although the circumstances of Young's arrest were likely to have been intimidating, the record demonstrates that after he was taken into custody, Woeppel and Hanley holstered their guns, spoke to Young in a conversational tone and explained that they were with the DEA and were there to execute an arrest warrant. It was only after this explanation that the agents asked Young whether they could search the residence. The credible testimony demonstrates that Young agreed to the search and assisted the agents in identifying the key to the front door.” United States v. Young, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151160 (W.D. N.Y. October 19, 2012).*

Pre-Jones GPS was not suppressed because of the officers' good faith. United States v. Robinson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151257 (E.D. Mo. May 24, 2012):

In light of the Supreme Court's opinions in Knotts and Karo, as interpreted and applied by the Ninth Circuit in Pineda-Moreno, the Seventh Circuit in Garcia, and subsequently by the Eighth Circuit in Marquez, the undersigned concludes that the agents acted in objective, reasonable reliance on binding precedent when they installed and used the GPS tracker device. As such, the evidence obtained by using the GPS tracker device should not be suppressed. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429 (noting that "in 27 years of practice under Leon's good-faith exception, [the Supreme Court has] never applied the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained as a result of nonculpable, innocent police conduct" (citation omitted)).

In this case, the relevant binding precedent was not factually identical and was ultimately distinguished by the Court in Jones. But the agents' ultimately erroneous interpretation of Supreme Court precedent was no more culpable than if they had relied on factually identical Supreme Court precedent that was later overturned. See id. at 2439 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that an officer is not "more culpable where circuit precedent is simply suggestive rather than 'binding,' where it only describes how to treat roughly analogous instances, or where it just does not exist"). As evidenced by the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits' holdings, the agents' interpretation of binding precedent was reasonable; the agents did not exploit an unanswered or disputed question of law. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 561 (1982) ("Official awareness of the dubious constitutionality of a practice would be counterbalanced by official certainty that, so long as the Fourth Amendment law in the area remained unsettled, evidence obtained through the questionable practice would be excluded only in the one case definitively resolving the unsettled question."). See also Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (recognizing that although the court of appeals required the "precedent on a given point [to be] unequivocal," the majority in Davis left this issue unresolved).

Reason.com: Little-Known Device Raises Big Fourth Amendment Implications:

On Friday, EFF and the ACLU submitted an amicus brief in United States v. Rigmaiden, a closely-followed case that has enormous consequences for individuals' Fourth Amendment rights in their home and on their cell phone. As the Wall Street Journal explained today, the technology at the heart of the case invades the privacy of countless innocent people that have never even been suspected of a crime.

Rigmaiden centers around a secretive device that federal law enforcement and local police have been using with increased frequency: an International Mobile Subscriber Identity locator, or “IMSI catcher.” These devices allow the government to electronically search large areas for a particular cell phone's signal—sucking down data on potentially thousands of innocent people along the way—while attempting to avoid many of the traditional limitations set forth in the Constitution.

Source: EFF. Read full article. (link)

Accidentally leaving one’s turn signal on is not evidence of impairment, without more. Killebrew v. State, 2012 Ind. App. LEXIS 528 (October 19, 2012).*

Failure to argue to the trial court that the lineup was based on unlawful detention waived the argument for appeal. State v. Rucker, 2012 Ohio 4860, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 4254 (2d Dist. October 19, 2012).*

The officers’ entry into defendant’s motel room for a protective sweep was unjustified. Excising those observations from the search warrant affidavit, however, still left probable cause for the search warrant. State v. Bell, 2012 Ohio 4853, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 4244 (2d Dist. October 19, 2012).*