Defendant was stopped at the San Jose light rail station around midnight for allegedly resembling one of two Black males who were suspected of committing a sexual battery a week earlier at noon. After he provided a false ID, he was arrested and cocaine base was found. The court finds that the description of the assailants a week earlier did not match defendant, and there was no justification for his detention in the first place. People v. Walker, 210 Cal. App. 4th 165, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 271 (6th Dist. 2012).*

Third party consent justified the police entry. Their view of the premises from open fields first was not unlawful. City of Mansfield v. Studer, 2012 Ohio 4840, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 4242 (5th Dist. October 17, 2012).*

The traffic stop was justified by an unsignaled lane change, and reasonable suspicion existed from defendant having been followed from a drug house. The wait for the drug dog was minimal. Wilson v. State, 318 Ga. App. 59, 733 S.E.2d 365 (2012).*

Officers conducting a knock and talk got no answer at the front door, and they went around to the back where there was no path. There was no justification for going to the back door, and the view of marijuana plants in the back is suppressed. State v. Pasour, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 1201 (October 16, 2012):

Here, the officers were within the curtilage of the home when they viewed the plants, regardless of whether they were in the back or side yards. See Rhodes, 151 N.C. App. at 214, 565 S.E.2d at 270 (2002). There is no indication from the record that the plants were visible from the front or from the road. The trial court found that there was a "no trespassing" sign that was "plainly visible" on the side of the residence where the officers walked. Even though the officers claim they did not see the sign, such a sign is evidence of the homeowner's intent that the side and back of the home were not open to the public. Unlike in Garcia, there is no evidence here to suggest that there was a path of any kind or anything else to suggest a visitor's use of the rear door; instead, all visitor traffic appeared to be kept to the front door and traffic to the rear was discouraged as a result of the posted sign. See Garcia, 997 F.2d at 1279-80.

Further, similar to the circumstances in Pena, there is no evidence in the record that suggests that the officers had reason to believe that knocking at Defendant's back door would produce a response after knocking multiple times at his front and side doors had not. At the suppression hearing, the officers testified that they went into Defendant's backyard as part of "standard procedure" to see if anyone was in the backyard or in the residence. The State argues that one of the police officers heard a sound within the dwelling, and as such, it was reasonable to believe that there was someone home who was simply unaware of the officers' presence, and so the officers were justified in entering the backyard. The officers admit that they never saw anyone come out of the house, nor did they hear noises coming from the back of the house. It is also unclear from the hearing transcript as to whether the officers started around back before or after they became aware that the officer knocking at the door had even heard a noise, as one testified that they started back after the initial knock and the other testified they started back after their fellow officer heard a noise. The officer that heard the noise was not able to identify when in time he heard it, what the noise sounded like, where it came from, or even if it sounded like a person moving around. Furthermore, the trial court made no finding of fact on this point; instead it only found that the officers went around back as was "standard procedure" "to observe anyone leaving the house" and for officer safety. Neither this finding nor the underlying facts is sufficient to support the officers' movement toward the back of the house.

Given the circumstances of this case, there was no justification for the officers to enter Defendant's backyard and so their actions were violative of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress.

There are cases contra.

Defendant’s stop was valid but arrest for a misdemeanor that didn’t happen in the presence of the officer was invalid, but that does not require suppression of the observations he was under the influence nor prevent the prosecution. People v. Norton, 2012 V.I. LEXIS 49 (Super. Ct. October 15, 2012).

The police search of defendant’s car after his allegedly unlawful arrest was with independent probable cause from the arrest. The police already knew everything. State v. Moreno, __ Wn. App. __, 286 P.3d 725 (2012).*

Respondents showed that the money seized was taken from them so they had standing. State ex rel. Mashburn v. $18,007.00 in United States Currency, 2012 OK CIV APP 75, 2012 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 76 (October 11, 2012).*

Probable cause for defendant’s arrest for drugs justified a search of the car under the automobile exception, an exception to Gant. United States v. Davidson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150513 (E.D. Pa. October 19, 2012).*

Substantially corroborated information from a citizen informant provided probable cause to issue a search warrant. Plaintiff’s claim of false statements in the statement of probable cause was not material because, even if it was assumed, there was probable cause on the remainder. Samadian v. Meade, 494 Fed. Appx. 490 (5th Cir. 2012).*

Officers had a shots fired domestic disturbance call. At the scene, the apartment seemed abandoned, and officers were justified in entering it. Defense counsel was not ineffective for not raising it. Colón-Díaz v. United States, 899 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D. P.R. 2012).*

Defendant’s asserted standing in the house searched was because he had drug money in the safe. It was somebody else’s place used for cocaine production. This was governed by Carter. United States v. Rivera-Pabon, 493 Fed. Appx. 15 (11th Cir. 2012).*

Defendant was stopped for a lane change violation after the officer already noted that the windows were too dark. The stop was lawful on the second traffic offense, too. The length of the stop to complete the paperwork was only seven minutes, and that’s reasonable. United States v. Whitlock, 493 Fed. Appx. 27 (11th Cir. 2012).*

Defendant was the target of a search warrant for taking artifacts from protected lands in Alaska which he even revealed on a website photograph. When officers got there, they found child pornography on the walls. They left and got another search warrant for that, and it was proper. United States v. Franz, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149882 (E.D. Pa. October 18, 2012).*